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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigate the issues related to 
corporate governance and executive compensation. In Chapter 1 I employ a sample of 
U.S. public firms to investigate the effect of executive compensation, especially short-
term incentives, upon corporate innovation strategies. I show that CEOs with longer 
“pay duration” and CEOs receiving a higher “executive vega” direct their firms into 
more exploratory, as opposed to exploitative, innovations. The results obtained from an 
instrumental variable estimation establish my conclusions. Chapter 2 examines the 
expected time to merger for a Special Purpose Acquisition Corporation (SPAC). A 
SPAC is a company created for the sole purpose of merging with a private firm looking 
to become publicly traded. A simple target acquisition model is employed in empirical 
investigation of the determinants of the time to a successful merger between a SPAC 
and a private firm. We consider seven sources of independent variables including SPAC 
managerial characteristics, investor characteristics, underwriter characteristics, 
macroeconomic conditions, financial conditions, the “first mover” phenomenon, and the 
SPAC characteristics. Survival analysis establishes that these sources yield over twenty 
right hand side variables as being statistically significant in determining the time to 
merger. Chapter 3 investigates the influence of the media upon executive compensation. 
Specifically, we study how incoming CEOs’ media exposure influences the changes in 
compensation relative to their predecessors’ during turnover events. While having a 
media exposure does not influence total compensation of a CEO, it affects the 
composition of the compensation package. Specifically, the proportion of stocks and 
options relative to the total pay are significantly higher among incoming CEOs with 
xii 
higher media exposures. Moreover, the compensation packages provide high delta to 
more visible CEOs. Our results suggest that the media acts as a “watchdog” which 
provides external monitoring power in setting CEO pays.  
  
xiii 
Chapter 1: CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Corporate Innovation 
 
1. Introduction 
What drives innovation? Identifying the determinants of innovation is important 
for at least three reasons. First of all, the economics literature has long characterized 
innovation as key to sustainable macroeconomic growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Solow, 
1957). Second, innovation creates positive externalities that increase the overall output 
for regional economies (Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). Third, 
at the firm level, innovation can dramatically boost the productivity and, consequently, 
the profitability of a company both in the short-run and long-run (Romer, 1986; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992; Porter, 1992). A growing literature has empirically examined the 
links between company characteristics and innovation, however, little is known about 
the link between managerial incentives and innovation activities. This paper attempts to 
fill this gap in the literature by investigating the effect of CEO compensation on firm 
innovation.  
The empirical challenge of this paper is the possibility of endogenous right hand 
side variables in my regressions. Regardless of the source of the problem – omitted 
variables, joint determination of variables, or reverse causality – explanatory variables 
must be exogenous. Unattended this issue results in biased and inconsistent parametric 
estimates. I employ two approaches to overcome this complication. First, I estimate the 
model with a two-stage-least squares (2SLS) procedure using two instrumental 
variables (IV): the size of the firm’s compensation committee and a dummy variable for 
whether or not the CEO serves as the chair of the compensation committee. Both 
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instruments are correlated with the control variables but both remain relatively 
independent of the firm’s innovation efforts. Second, I employ a quasi-natural 
experiment (QNE) proposed by Gormley and Matsa (2011) and Gormley, Matsa, and 
Milbourn (2013) to insure that risk-seeking incentives (executive vega) can influence 
corporate innovation decisions. In the QNE certain firms in the semiconductor industry 
are forced to change their compensation policy due to an unexpected increase in 
litigation risks. I empirically establish that the CEOs who receive lower risk-seeking 
incentives (executive vega) subsequently direct their firms towards less risky innovation 
projects.  
My paper adopts novel computational measures of CEO incentives and firm 
innovative efforts. For instance, “pay duration”, a weighted average of the vesting 
periods of the different components of executive pay, is used to capture CEO’s short-
termism. CEOs with longer pay duration are expected to favor long-term investment 
projects, while CEOs with shorter pay duration may meet short-term goals at the 
expense of long-term benefits. In this essay, “exploratory innovation” measures the 
extent of the firm’s exploratory effort, which relies on acquiring new skills and 
knowledge. “Exploitative innovation”, on the other hand, is a variable that documents 
the extent to which the firm’s innovation is supported by the existing expertise the firm 
currently possesses. The overall findings of the paper support the notion that CEOs are 
sensitive to the incentives provided by their compensation packages and, additionally, 
those incentives influence the firms’ innovation strategies. Specifically, CEOs who 
suffer less from short-termism and who enjoy a higher “executive vega” direct their 
firms into exploratory innovation activities. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
2 
shareholders can effectively influence a firm’s long-term investment policy, especially 
the firm’s innovative strategy, with the appropriate configuration of the CEO’s 
compensation package.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on innovation and executive compensation. Section 3 reports the sample 
formation process, describes the key variables of interest, and presents the descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 develops the main hypothesis of this paper, and reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides additional robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1.Extant Literature on Innovation 
The economic literature on innovation dates back to the 1930s, when Joseph 
Schumpeter (1934, 1942) labeled innovation as a “creative destruction” process. In this 
process, new, better-developed products are constantly brought to the market by new 
firms, replacing old products and thereby eliminating old firms. The “creative 
destruction” process continues indefinitely as new innovating firms constantly enter the 
market by learning from the recently introduced products and making improvements 
upon them.  
Subsequent to Schumpeter, researchers have developed various theoretical 
models to address innovation and its relation to executive compensation configurations. 
Among them, Holmstrom (1989) shows that the inclusion of tolerance for failures in 
executive incentive plans is crucial to the success of innovation. He argues that short-
3 
term payoffs are a noisy measure of productive innovative activities, and hence, to 
motivate innovation, a compensation scheme must be less dependent on immediate firm 
profits. Following Holmstrom (1989), Aghion and Tirole (1994) maintain that it is 
difficult to develop a contract based upon innovative activities because the outcomes are 
unpredictable. More recently, Manso (2011) models the innovation process as a 
combination of the exploration of new untested actions and the exploitation of well-
known knowledge. While the exploitation of well-known actions involves less 
uncertainty and can ensure reasonable payoffs, it hinders the discovery of new 
knowledge that can occasion a dramatic competitive advantage for the firm. Exploring 
new untested actions may reveal potentially superior outcomes, but it is highly risky and 
may end up as both a waste of time and of resources. Manso (2011) finds that an 
optimal contract that encourages innovation should provide tolerance for failures in the 
short run and rewards for innovative success in the long run.  
There is ample empirical evidence that establishes a relation between corporate 
characteristics and their innovative activities. For instance, access to capital, either 
through public equity or bank loans, increases innovative productivity (Amore, 
Schneider, and Žaldokas, 2013; Gao, Hsu, and Li, 2014). Corporate innovation prospers 
when the level of tolerance for failure is high (Tian and Wang, 2014). On the other 
hand, corporations reduce their innovative efforts when they experience an increase in 
stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2013) or analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013), 
because both factors pressure managers to boost short-run firm performance.  
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2.2.Extant Literature on Executive Incentives 
Stein (1988) models managerial short-termism and maintains that long-term 
investment projects carry greater information asymmetry than their short-term 
counterparts. Stein adds, consequently, target firm shareholders often receive 
undervalued bids if a takeover takes place before the payoff of a long-term project is 
known to the public. To avoid undervalued takeovers, managers may choose to 
substitute short-term investments for long-term projects. Building upon Stein’s (1988) 
model, Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) argue that compensation contracts 
emphasizing short-term performance at the expense of long-term outlook can be 
optimal in a market where stock prices are a function of not only the fundamental firm 
value but also a short-term speculative component. In other words, the short-term firm 
performance can inflate stock prices above their “true” value and protect current 
shareholders from “cheap” takeovers. Empirically, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 
(2014) show that short-termism induces public-firm managers to invest at levels less 
than those that maximize the value of equity. In addition, Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen 
(2014) show that CEO’s concerns for the current stock price lead to reductions in real 
investments, such as R&D.  
 
3. Data Source, Sample Formation, and Key Variables 
3.1.Data Source 
The primary data sources include the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) U.S. Patent Citations Data File (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005), the 
Harvard Business School (HBS) Patent Network Dataverse (Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, 
5 
Sun, Torvik, Yu, and Fleming, 2014), Compustat, Execucomp, Incentive Lab, and 
RiskMetrics. 
The NBER U.S. Patent Citation Data File contains detailed information on about 
3.2 million U.S. patents granted between 1976 and 2006, and a broad match of patent 
assignees1 to Compustat firms. The data obtained from the HBS Patent Network 
Dataverse has the citation records of about 3.3 million patents granted between 1975 
and 2010. Specifically, each patent is linked to several granted patents that are referred 
to as citations. The executive compensation data comes from the Execucomp and the 
Incentive Lab. Execucomp provides details on the level and the components of annual 
executive pay for S&P 1000 firms since 1992, and the Incentive Lab provides 
information on vesting periods for each stock and option grant. Variables on various 
firm characteristics are collected from Compustat. The governance data comes from the 
Director Legacy Table of RiskMetrics database. Specifically, I obtain information on 
the size of compensation committee for each firm and whether the current CEO serves 
as the chair of the compensation committee from RiskMetrics.  
 
3.2.Sample Formation 
My sample for this study is formed by combining data from the aforementioned 
sources. First, I combine the patent information from NBER with the citation data from 
the HBS Patent Network Dataverse by using a unique patent assignee identifier 
PDPASS. With this combination, I am able to identify the patents that are cited by the 
same firm repeatedly and citations made by a firm’s own patents. All of these citations 
1 Based upon the NBER patent data definition, a patent assignee could be an individual or a corporation 
who is recognized as the patent owner. Often, an individual assignee works for a corporation. The NBER 
patent data has a match algorithm which matches the individual assignees to their employers.  
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are considered “exploitative” because they represent the use of a firm’s existing 
knowledge and skills. Second, I aggregate the citation information from the patent level 
to the firm (PDPASS) level. That is, I calculate the percentage of exploratory patents 
and exploitative patents for each firm. Third, I map each assignee number (PDPASS) 
onto a Compustat identifier (GVKEY) using the match provided by the NBER (Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). Most GVKEY’s can be linked to a unique PDPASS with 
some exceptions. For instance, if assignee A acquires assignee B in year t, assignee B 
will use assignee A’s GVKEY from year t on. At this point, the dataset contains  
percentage observations of exploratory and exploitative innovation activities at firm-
year level. Fourth, I combine datasets from Executivecomp and Incentive Lab. With 
these two sources, I have information on a) the size of each pay component (salary, 
bonus, restricted stocks, and option grants) for each CEO, and b) the vesting periods for 
each grant a CEO receives in any given year. Following the steps introduced by 
Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2013), I calculate the executive pay duration, 
which is a variable characterizing the economic life of the firm’s intertemporal 
liabilities to the CEO. Finally, I obtain annual firm characteristics from Compustat and 
merge this with the innovation dataset from step three and duration dataset from step 
four. My final sample covers 3019 firm-year observations from 611 distinct public 
companies during 1998 to 2006. This sample is used in all subsequent analyses except 
the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) regressions in section 4.4 and the differences-in-
differences-in-differences (DIDID) analysis in section 4.5. To address the possibility of 
endogenous independent variables, I use 2SLS estimation and employ instrumental 
variables provided by the RiskMetrics database. However, this source only covers a 
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subset of my final sample. Thus I use 2318 firm-year observations from 499 distinct 
firms, to perform the 2SLS regressions. As an alternative approach to address the issue 
of jointly determined right-hand-side variables, in section 4.5, I take advantage of a 
quasi-natural experiment that impacted a segment of firms in my original sample whose 
SIC code is 3674. Using firms with SIC codes between 3600 and 3699 but except 3674 
as a control group, my sample in this section includes 445 firm-year observations from 
63 distinct firms.  
 
3.3.Measures of Innovation Strategy 
Following Benner and Tushman (2002) and Gao et al. (2014), I categorize a 
firm’s innovation strategy as “exploratory” or “exploitative” based upon a numeric 
characteristic ascribed to the firm when it innovates. Exploratory innovation introduces 
a “uniqueness” to the production process from outside knowledge and skills that have 
not been previously used by the firm, while exploitative innovation comes from an 
application of the firm’s existing expertise. 
I first consider a firm’s innovation at the patent level. A patent is considered 
“exploratory” if 60% (alternatively 80%) or more of its citations are based on new 
knowledge outside of a firm’s existing expertise (i.e., not citing the existing patents 
owned by the firm itself nor the citations made by those patents). On the other hand, a 
patent is considered “exploitative” if 60% (alternatively 80%) or more of its citations 
belong to the firm’s existing knowledge (i.e., the firm’s existing patents and citations 
made by those patents).  
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After characterizing the extent to which each patent is explanatory, I aggregate 
over all of a firm’s patents to characterize the firm’s innovations. A firm’s exploratory 
innovation effort is captured by a ratio of the number of exploratory patents applied for 
in year t to year t+2 over the total number of patents applied for in the same period2. 
Given the fact that there is typically a 2- to 3-year lag between the patent application 
and its approval, I use the application year instead of the grant year to better capture the 
underlying innovation activities at the firm level. The variable is bounded between 0 
and 1, with a higher ratio suggesting that the firm deviates from its current knowledge 
base and expands into new technological territories. 
Similarly, a firm’s exploitative innovation effort is measured as the ratio of the 
number of exploitative patents applied for in year t to year t+2 over the total number of 
patents applied for in the same period. This variable also ranges from 0 and 1. A higher 
exploitative ratio suggests that the firm is utilizing its current expertise and maintaining 
its competitive advantages in the areas it is currently involved in. 
 
3.4.Measures of CEO Pay Duration 
Each year, the typical CEO receives compensation from a variety of sources 
including salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, option grants, etc. Some pay 
components, such as stock and option grants, carry a vesting period that typically differs 
from other components. A CEO could receive multiple stock or option grants in a fiscal 
year, with each grant having a unique vesting period. Gopalan et. al (2013) construct a 
novel measure, pay duration, to capture the aspects of short-term and long-term 
2 For robustness purpose, I also investigate intervals other than year t to t+2. Section 5 has more detailed 
discussions on the robustness tests.  
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executive pay and to quantify the intertemporal trajectory of executive compensation. 
As a close cousin of the duration measurement in bond literature, the pay duration is the 
weighted average of the vesting periods of the different components of executive pay, 
with the weight for each component being the fraction of that component in the total 
compensation package. Algebraically, the measure is calculated as 
∑∑
∑∑
==
==
+++
×+×+×+
=
os
os
n
j
j
n
i
i
n
j
jj
n
i
ii
optionstockrestrictedbonussalary
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11
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0)(
(1)34 
where i and j represent a restricted stock grant and an option grant, respectively. Salary, 
bonus, restricted stocki, and optionj are, respectively, dollar value of annual salary, 
dollar value of annual bonus, the value of restricted stock grant i with vesting period ti 
(in years)5, and the Black-Scholes value of option grant j with vesting period tj (in 
years).  
The measure of pay duration possesses several advantages over other 
measurements of the intertemporal aspects of CEO pay. First, it quantifies the 
magnitude to which the overall compensation package provides short-term incentives, 
as opposed to long-term incentives, to the CEOs. Second, pay duration also takes into 
account the overall effect that each component in executive compensation could have 
3 There are at least two concerns about the measure. First, it does not take into account the time value of 
money. Since most of the stock and option grants will become vesting in the “future”, CEOs may value 
those future income on a present value basis. Second, the measure does not account for CEO outside 
wealth (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), which refers to executive personal wealth that is not tied to the 
firm’s performance. I choose not to include adjustments for the factors because a) the existing measures 
for executive individual discount rates and executive outside wealth tend to be noisy and hence may bias 
my regression results, and b) by using the identical measure of Gopalan et. al (2013), I can ensure my 
calculation of pay duration is correct by comparing my summary statistics to theirs.  
4 I calculate the pay duration relative to the fiscal-year-end, so I assign a vesting period of zero to both 
salary and bonus. 
5 Based on Execucomp documentation, the value of the stock grants are determined as of the date of the 
grant.  
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upon CEO incentives. This is achieved by assigning a weight parameter that is unique 
to each component based upon their size relative to total compensation.  
Previous literature has proposed several computational measurements of 
executive compensation. For example, Bushman and Smith (2001) use the proportion of 
non-cash pay, primarily stock and option grants, in total pay to capture the incentives 
from the “speculative” and “intangible” part of total compensation; Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) study the sensitivity of executive wealth to stock price movement, which 
essentially captures executives’ preference to stock volatility or firm risk. Pay duration 
distinguishes itself from previous measures by adding a unique time dimension into the 
characterization of executive incentives.  
The time dimension is particularly important when it comes to a firm’s 
innovation decisions. Innovation decisions are time sensitive: it takes longer to develop 
innovative projects that are exploratory and to realize payoffs from such projects, if 
any. On the other hand, exploitative projects can be generated and outcomes realized 
over a shorter time horizon. The analysis here tests for a causal relationship between 
pay duration and innovation strategies. 
 
3.5.Executive Vega 
Following Core and Guay (2002) and Coles, et. al (2006), I also calculate 
executive vega in order to capture other incentives embedded in executive 
11 
compensation. Executive vega measures the dollar change in CEO wealth (in $000s) 
associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns.6 
Core and Guay (2002) document a major regulatory change for the accounting 
of equity-based compensation. FAS 123R was issued by the FASB (Financial 
Accounting Standard Board) in 2004 and enacted in 2006. The new rules in FAS 123R 
require firms to expense equity-based compensation based at the fair value on the grant 
date.  Consequently, firms report equity-based compensation in different formats both 
before and after 2006. My calculation of executive vega follows the methodology under 
the “old” reporting format, since the data used in this research covers the period 1998 to 
2006. 
I assume that the typical CEO receives equity-based incentives from three 
option portfolios: (1) the current year’s option grants, (2) a portfolio of unvested options 
from previously-granted awards, and (3) a portfolio of vested options. The total equity-
based incentives are given by the summation of the dollar amounts provided by these 
three portfolios. To calculate the incentives from portfolio (1), I obtain the number of 
options granted during the year, the exercise price, and maturity. The striking prices for 
portfolios (2) and (3) are not reported in Execucomp and hence are estimated with the 
technique outlined in Core and Guay (2002).7 
 
6 By using the standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns as a proxy for firm risks, Core and Guay (2002) 
and Coles, et. al (2006), among others, uses the executive vega to capture the sensitivity of a CEO’s 
income relative to the changes in firm risks.  
7 Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2013) provide step-by-step instructions on the calculations of executive 
delta and vega.  
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3.6.Summary Statistics 
Table 1-1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample. Definitions of all variables 
can be found in Appendix 1-1. My sample contains 611 unique firms and 3019 firm-
year observations during 1998 to 2006. To be included in the sample, I require a) a firm 
has to have at least one granted patent over the three-year period from year t to year t+2, 
and b) a firm has to be covered by all aforementioned data sources, namely NBER, 
HBS, ExecuComp, Incentive Lab, and Compustat in a given year t. 
[Insert Table 1-1 about here] 
I compare the summary statistics from my sample to those from the extant 
literature. Specifically, Gao et. al (2014) report the mean and standard deviation of the 
variable Explore60 to be 0.51 and 0.29, which are close to the 0.57 and 0.25 reported in 
my sample. The statistics of Explore80 are also similar. The mean and standard 
deviation of variable pay duration in my sample are, respectively, 2.25 (mean) and 1.77 
(standard deviation), which are similar to the 2.22 (mean) and 2.5 (standard deviation) 
reported by Gopalan et. al (2013). 
 
4. Main Hypothesis and Empirical Results 
4.1.Hypothesis 
While empirical evidence suggests that corporate innovation activities can be 
affected by many characteristics at firm level, there is, however, very little research that 
establishes a direct link between managerial incentives and firm innovation. In the 
limited literature, Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) examine the innovation 
activities and executive pay at division level by employing a simultaneous equation 
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model. They document that the proportion of compensation tied to long-term 
components is related to a division’s subsequent innovation activities. Baranchuk, 
Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) investigate the incentives embedded in the executive 
compensation in the newly public firms and find that length of vesting period is 
positively related to the firm’s innovative activities, which is measured by the number 
of granted patents. 
A typical compensation package for a CEO usually includes salary, bonus, 
restricted stock grants, option grants, etc. While salary and bonus are paid in cash and 
are immediately available to the CEO, stocks and options are usually granted with a 
vesting period during which the grants cannot be sold or exercised. Vesting periods are 
arguably an effective mechanism to align an executive’s self-interest with those of long-
term corporate goals (Murphy, 1999; Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Only after the 
expiration of the vesting period can an executive freely sell their stock awards and 
exercise their granted options. Therefore, the prospect of profiting from equity sales 
upon vesting encourages the managers to pursue projects that boost stock prices around 
the expiration of vesting periods. Although executives receive their compensation from 
different components with various vesting periods, I use pay duration to quantify the 
“representative” vesting period of the CEO at hand. 
Real investment in innovation, especially exploratory innovation, is highly risky 
and the payoff is usually temporally remote (Phelps, 2010; O’Connor and Rafferty, 
2012; Gao et. al, 2014; Tian and Wang, 2014). A “short-termist” CEO faces more 
pressure to meet short-term goals, possibly at the expense of sacrificing projects with 
long-term benefits (Gopalan et. al, 2013; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist , 2014; 
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Edmans, Fang, and Lewllen, 2014). Thus, I expect “short-termist” CEOs to reduce real 
investment in exploratory innovations.  
H1: The larger the temporal characterization of executive compensation, pay 
duration, the greater the tendency of the firm to engage in exploratory innovation. 
Not only can executive incentives arise from the vesting schedule of stock and 
option grants, the incentives can also come from the association of the CEO wealth8 
relative to the change in firm stock volatility (executive vega). Coles et. al (2006) find 
that higher executive vega leads to risker policy choices, including more investment in 
R&D. Relative to exploitative innovation, exploratory innovation bears higher risks as 
its payoffs take longer to realize and are of greater uncertainty (Manso, 2011). As 
McGrath (2001) points out, high levels of exploratory innovation imply variance-
seeking instead of mean-seeking learning process. A CEO with higher executive vega 
would benefit from the higher volatility of the firm stocks, and hence would engage the 
firm in more exploratory innovation activities.  
H2: The higher the firm’s executive vega, the more exploratory a firm’s 
innovations. 
 
4.2.Univariate Tests 
To gain some basic insights, I first present the findings from univariate analysis 
of the relationship between executive incentives and firm innovation activities. In Panel 
A of Table 1-2, I split my sample into firms whose CEO has above- and below-median 
pay duration, and compare the characteristics across the two subsamples. The 
8 The literature, such as Core and Guay (2002) and Coles, et. al (2006), has been using the words “CEO 
compensation”, “CEO income”, and “CEO wealth” interchangeably.  
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difference in means of pay duration across the subsamples is 2.85 years, which is 
equivalent to 1.61 standard deviations of the pay duration variable. It speaks to the 
dispersion of my pay duration variable. As discussed in Section 3.3, my measurement 
of innovative strategy at firm level is the ratio of the number of exploratory patents 
applied for in year t to year t+2 over the total number of patents applied for in the same 
period. For a patent to be considered as “exploratory”, 60% (80%) of its citations must 
come from outside the firm’s current expertise. In other words, these citations can 
neither be patents granted to the firm nor the patents the firm has cited before. 
Interestingly, the univariate results document that CEOs with longer pay duration are 
associated with firms that engage in exploratory activates. In terms of firm 
characteristics, CEOs with longer duration usually come from firms with lower 
leverage, higher R&D investment, and lower PPE (property, plant, and equipment) 
investment. These results are statistically significant at 1% confidence interval. 
[Insert Table 1-2 about here] 
In Panel B of Table 1-2, I split the sample into halves based on CEO incentive 
vega, and compare the characteristics across the two subsamples. The difference in 
means of executive vega across the subsamples is 444.42 (in $000), which is equivalent 
to 0.92 standard deviations of the vega variable. This speaks to the dispersion of my 
executive vega variable. The univariate results support the hypothesis H2 that CEOs 
with higher executive vega engage their firms in more exploratory innovations. CEOs 
receive higher executive vega from larger and older firms (as shown in the differences 
in total assets and firm age), firms with higher R&D investment and ROA, and firms 
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with lower CAPEX (capital expenditures) and PPE (property, plant, and equipment) 
investment. These results are statistically significant. 
 
4.3.Baseline Multivariate Analysis 
In order to investigate the possible determinants of a firm’s exploratory strategy, 
I perform regression analysis on the following equation: 
ittiitit
ititit
YearFEFirmFEFirmCEO
CEOveganPayDuratioExplore
εηγ
ββα
+++++
++= 21            (2) 
where i indicates firm and t denotes time in years. The term Explore details the firm’s 
exploratory innovation strategy, measured by explore60 and explore80. CEO is a 
column vector of CEO characteristic variables, including CEO tenure at the current firm 
and the executive’s delta (Core and Guay, 2002), which measures the dollar change in 
CEO compensation (in $000s) associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price. 
Firm is a column vector of firm characteristic variables, including leverage, PPE, ROA, 
sales growth, etc. FirmFE and YearFE represent the firm and year fixed effects that 
controls for unobservable firm and time characteristics. 
The OLS estimates from Equation (2) can suffer from at least two problems. 
First, the OLS estimates may become difficult to interpret. Econometricians usually 
interpret the results as follows: a one unit increase in duration and vega is associated 
with 𝛽𝛽1�and 𝛽𝛽2� percentage points increase in exploratory ratio. While the dependent 
variable in Equation (2) is a ratio bounded between 0 and 1, the OLS estimation 
imposes no restrictions on boundary of the predicted values. When the predicted values 
exceed the boundary of [0, 1], the interpretation becomes meaningless. Second, the 
error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is likely to be heteroskedastic in this case. Heteroskedasticity occurs when 
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the variances of the error terms are not constant across observations, which is possible 
in my case. Even after careful control for firm and CEO characteristics, I still expect to 
observe greater variation in exploratory innovation activities among more innovative 
firms than those less innovative counterparts. The variation could arise from other 
sources that are not controlled for such as location and industry, and therefore may vary 
across firms. Greene (2008) shows that the OLS estimates under heteroskedasticity are 
still unbiased but no longer efficient. To address the issues above, I use the Tobit model 
proposed by James Tobin (1958) which produces maximum likelihood, as opposed to 
OLS, estimators. Specifically, Tobit model assumes that there exists an unobserved 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗, which linearly depends on explanatory variables. While the 
unobserved variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is not bounded, its observed counterpart 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖is. For instance, the 
observed dependent variable exploratory ratio in Equation (2) has two boundaries (0 
and 1). Algebraically,  
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Let Φbe the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 𝜙𝜙be the standard 
normal probability density function. For a dataset with N observations the log likelihood 
function is:  
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[Insert Table 1-3 about here] 
In Table 1-3, I relate pay duration and executive vega to firm exploratory 
innovation activities. First I estimate Equation (2) with Tobit regression models which 
are immune to the problems mentioned above, and I report the results in columns (1) to 
(3). The results in column (3) highlight the notion that longer pay duration and higher 
executive vega can incentivize CEOs to engage their firms into exploratory innovations. 
While the predicted values from Tobit regressions are bounded between 0 and 1, the 
Tobit model cannot account for unobserved firm-specific factors and unobserved year-
specific factors. Therefore, I re-estimate Equation (2) using panel regressions with firm 
and year fixed effects and report results in columns (4) to (6). Depending on the 
regression specifications, a one year increase in pay duration is associated with a 0.36 
to 0.41 percentage points increase in exploratory innovations, and a one standard 
deviation increase in executive vega is associated with 1.25 to 1.30 percentage points 
increase in exploratory innovation. The results for both pay duration and executive vega 
are statistically significant. The panel regression results also show that exploratory 
innovation is negatively related to CEO tenure, which indicates that CEO entrenchment 
is detrimental to a firm’s innovative activities9. In addition, I find a firm’s capital 
expenditures and previous sales growth are statistically significant, both having positive 
relationships with subsequent exploratory innovations.  
9 Although the CEO tenure only serves as a control variable, its effect on innovation deserves some 
discussion. I believe the direction of such effect is an empirical matter. On one hand, entrenched CEOs 
could be very successful in innovation in the past and has therefore been able to secure their job. On the 
other hand, entrenched CEO may have directed their firms to avoided large losses by disengaging their 
firms from innovating activities. My empirical results lend support to the latter hypothesis.  
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In order to test the robustness of my results, in Panel B of Table 1-3 I redefine 
an exploratory patent as the one of which 80%, rather than 60%, or more citations come 
from outside the current expertise and recalculate the exploratory ratio. I obtain similar 
results from both the Tobit regression and the panel regression with fixed effects, which 
confirm that CEO incentives, especially pay duration and executive vega, are important 
determinants in the nature of a firm’s innovation activities.  
So far the empirical results are supportive of my hypotheses H1 and H2, which 
maintain that longer pay duration and higher executive vega encourage a firm’s 
exploratory innovations. However, my Tobit and panel regression results in this 
subsection may suffer from having explanatory variables that are not exogenous.  If so, 
the estimated coefficients in Table 1-3 could be biased and inconsistent. To substantiate 
the empirical results, I propose two approaches to address my apprehensions about 
endogenous right-hand-side variables: a 2SLS regression approach with instrumental 
variables and a DIDID approach utilizing a quasi-natural experiment.  
 
4.4.Two Stage Least Square Regressions 
The key variables of interest in this study, pay duration and executive vega, may 
be contemporaneously determined with the error term in equation (2). The 2SLS 
approach eliminates the endogeneity problem by using instrumental variables that 
arguably correlate only with the right-hand-side endogenous variables but not the left-
hand-side dependent variables10. In other words, instead of making direct impact on the 
dependent variables, an IV should only influence the dependent variable through its 
effect on the endogenously-determined variables. While the OLS may produce biased 
10 See Appendix 1-3 for a detailed discussion on instrumental variables.  
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estimators due to possible correlation between the endogenous variables and the error 
term, the 2SLS is immune to such problems as the IVs are independent from the error 
term. I propose to use a) the size of the compensation committee and, b) a binary 
variable to document whether or not the CEO serves as the chair of the compensation 
committee as instrumental variables. 
Both proposed instrumental variables speak to the composition of the 
compensation committee, which is in charge of setting executive pay and determining 
the incentives embedded in the compensation contract. For example, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000) document that firms with weak governance often suffer from 
excessive managerial power, such as CEOs chairing the compensation committee. 
Therefore, I expect such CEOs to receive shorter pay duration and higher vega from 
their compensation packages. At the same time, it is unclear how the compensation 
committee, the size or who is in charge, can directly relate to firm innovative activities. 
In an untabulated OLS regression of Explore60*1000 on the two instrumental variables, 
I found neither coefficient on the two IVs to be statistically significant. In fact, the R2 of 
0.0002 suggests that the IVs can hardly explain any variations in the innovative 
activities.  
[Insert Table 1-4 about here] 
In the first stage of the 2SLS estimation, I regress pay duration and executive 
vega, two variables that could potentially be endogenous, on the proposed IVs. In the 
second stage, instead of regressing the dependent variables on pay duration and 
executive vega directly, I replace these variables with the predicted values obtained in 
the first stage. In Table 4, I report the results from both stages. The first stage results 
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lend support to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), and managerial power literature in 
general, that CEOs who serve on their own firms’ compensation committee receive 
shorter pay duration and higher vega from their remuneration. The results from the 
second stage continue to support both hypothesis H1 and H2. Specifically, a one year 
increase in pay duration, or equivalently increasing pay duration from the 50th 
percentile to roughly 70th percentile, can lead to a 13.87 to 18.52 percentage points 
increase in exploratory innovations. The results are statistically significant. Meanwhile, 
a one standard deviation increase in executive vega can increase exploratory innovations 
by 16.8 to 24.0 percentage points. 
 
4.5.A Quasi-Natural Experiment 
4.5.1. Background 
As an alternative approach to overcome possible endogeneity problems, I 
employ a natural experiment, which was first introduced by Gormley and Matsa (2011) 
and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), to help identify a causal link between CEO 
vega and firm innovative efforts. This natural experiment introduces an unexpected 
increase in litigation risks to certain firms in my sample (treatment firms), while some 
other firms (control firms) in related industries remain unaffected. This particular 
scenario provides a unique opportunity to study how firms respond to such changes in 
terms of their innovation strategies. Since firms are randomly assigned into a treatment 
group or a control group, it becomes highly unlikely that unobservable firm and 
executive characteristics can play a role in determining a firm’s innovation efforts. By 
calculating the difference in innovation outcomes between the treatment firms and the 
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control firms before and after the exogenous shock, I am able to establish an association 
between exploratory ratios and CEO incentives. 
About every two years, the National Toxicology Program (NTP) publishes its 
bi-annual Report on Carcinogens (RoC). In the report published in 2000, the NTP 
updated a list of substances that are known or can be reasonably suspected to be 
carcinogenic, among which trichloroethylene was added for the first time. 
Trichloroethylene is widely used as industrial solvent in the semiconductor and related 
devices industry (SIC 3674). According to the National Occupational Exposure Survey 
(NOES), 8.5% of employees in this industry are exposed to the substance. As Gormley 
and Matsa (2011) and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) point out, the addition of 
trichloroethylene as a potential carcinogen to the RoC exposes firms in the 
semiconductor industry (SIC 3674) to greater liability risks11. In other words, the 
exogenous increase in legal liabilities would increase firms’, and hence managers’, 
exposure to the risk of poor future corporate performance. Consequently, I expect the 
affected firms (SIC 3674) to react to the sudden shock by decreasing their investment in 
exploratory innovation because the future payoffs from such investment tend to be 
highly uncertain. However, managers with longer pay duration and higher executive 
vega in the affected industry, may exhibit more resistance to the idea of reducing 
exploratory investment because their compensation is largely tied to future payoffs. 
Hence their effort in exploratory innovation should fall less than their counterparts with 
shorter pay duration and lower executive vega. 
11 The U.S. legal system requires employers to compensate employees for all job-related illnesses and 
injuries irrespective of fault. Once the court recognizes employment as at least one of the factors 
contributing to such illness and injuries, the employer becomes liable for the entire medical expenses. See 
Schwartz (1985) and Peirce and Dworkin (1988) for details.  
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 4.5.2. Differences-in-differences (DID) Tests 
DID is an econometric technique that helps to quantify the outcome of a QNE. It 
compares the average response of the outcome variable (or dependent variable) over 
time for the treated group to its counterpart, the control group. The name of DID stems 
from the particular methodology of measuring the “difference in the differences” 
between the treatment and control group over time. 
To calculate the differences, the DID requires data measured before and after the 
treatment, which is the QNE in my example. In the generalized simple DID model 
illustrated in Figure 1, the treated group and the control group are represented by lines T 
and C, respectively. The outcome variable Y is measured for both groups before the 
QNE, represented by the points y11 and y21. While the QNE occurs unexpectedly to the 
treatment group only, the outcome variable Y is measured again for both groups after 
the QNE, represented by y12 and y22. Note that not all the difference between the treated 
and the control groups after the QNE (i.e., the difference between y12 and y22) can be 
attributed to the treatment because a difference already exists between the two even 
before the QNE. The DID therefore excludes the “expected” difference in y between the 
two groups throughout the process regardless of the QNE, represented by the paralleled 
dashed line C’ and the solid line C. The DID only considers the “net” difference (i.e., 
the difference between y12 and y22’) as the treatment effect.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Algebraically, consider the model𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where yist is the 
dependent variable for individual i, given state s and time t. 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 and 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 is the intercept 
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for s and t, respectively. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a dummy variable of treatment status, 𝛿𝛿 is the treatment 
effect, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term. Suppose for simplicity s = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2. To obtain an 
estimate of the “net” effect from a sample consisting of multiple observations, I 
aggregate the outcome variable Y at each state s and at each time point t to get their 
averages, 𝑦𝑦11����, 𝑦𝑦12����, 𝑦𝑦21����, and 𝑦𝑦22����. Then,    (𝑦𝑦11���� −  𝑦𝑦12����) −  (𝑦𝑦21���� −  𝑦𝑦22����)  = [(𝛾𝛾1 + 𝜔𝜔1 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿11 + 𝜖𝜖11����) − (𝛾𝛾1 + 𝜔𝜔2 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿12 + 𝜖𝜖12����)]
− [(𝛾𝛾2 + 𝜔𝜔1 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿21 + 𝜖𝜖21����) −  (𝛾𝛾2 + 𝜔𝜔2 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿22 + 𝜖𝜖22����)]  = 𝛿𝛿(𝛿𝛿11 − 𝛿𝛿12) + 𝛿𝛿(𝛿𝛿22 − 𝛿𝛿21) + 𝜖𝜖11���� − 𝜖𝜖12���� − 𝜖𝜖21���� + 𝜖𝜖22���� 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂,𝐸𝐸[(𝑦𝑦11���� −  𝑦𝑦12����) −  (𝑦𝑦21���� −  𝑦𝑦22����)] =  𝛿𝛿(𝛿𝛿11 − 𝛿𝛿12) + 𝛿𝛿(𝛿𝛿22 − 𝛿𝛿21) 
Without loss of generality, assuming D22 = 1 and D11 = D12 = D21 = 0 so that I can solve 
for an estimate of 𝛿𝛿, then  
𝛿𝛿 = (𝑦𝑦11���� −  𝑦𝑦12����) −  (𝑦𝑦21���� −  𝑦𝑦22����) 
which can be interpreted as the treatment effect of the QNE.  
Empirically, the DID test can be implemented according to the table below, in 
which the lower right cell represents the DID estimator. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 s = 2 s = 1 Difference 
t = 2 𝑦𝑦22 𝑦𝑦12 𝑦𝑦12 −  𝑦𝑦22 
t = 1 𝑦𝑦21 𝑦𝑦11 𝑦𝑦11 −  𝑦𝑦21 
Change 𝑦𝑦21 −  𝑦𝑦22 𝑦𝑦11 −  𝑦𝑦12 (𝑦𝑦11 −  𝑦𝑦21) − (𝑦𝑦12 −  𝑦𝑦22) 
 
Although the method documented above is intuitively straightforward, its 
application in statistical packages can be very tedious. To make the estimation more 
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software-friendly, researchers have been using an OLS framework to obtain the DID 
estimators that are equivalent to the ones obtained from the tabled method: 
𝑦𝑦 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽3(𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑆) +  𝜀𝜀 
where T is a dummy variable for after QNE, and S is a dummy variable for the treated 
group. The interaction term T*S is then a dummy variable indicating when S = T = 1. 
While the estimated coefficient𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 measures the difference between the two time 
periods and that between the two groups, 𝛽𝛽3 is an estimator for the treatment effect (i.e. 
the lower right cell of the table above).  
I adopted one differences-in-differences model and one differences-in-
differences-in-differences model to quantify the impact of pay duration and executive 
vega upon exploratory innovation under the quasi-natural experiment setting. In the 
DID model, I investigate if and how CEO incentives, pay duration and executive vega, 
among the treated and controlled firms react differently to the sudden increase in 
litigation risks with the following specification:  
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++++
++++= 321 *                  (3) 
Here i indicates firm and t denotes time in years. Incentive refers, alternatively, to CEO 
pay duration and CEO vega; treat and after are dummy variables for treated firms and 
post-treatment years, respectively. The key variable of interest is 1β , and I expect it to 
be negative as Gormley et al. (2013) found that corporate boards reduce CEO’s risk 
exposure immediately following unfavorable shocks that could hurt firm value. 
Extending the DID model, I examine if and how corporate innovative efforts 
change in response to the quasi-natural experiment, conditional upon the treatment 
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group assignment and incentive levels. A differences-in-differences-in-differences 
(DIDID) model provides statistical tests for this circumstance. The first difference 
comes from CEO incentives. I characterize a CEO as having high pay duration 
(executive vega) if average pay duration (executive vega) prior to 2000 is above the 
median. Alternatively, a CEO has a low pay duration (executive vega) if his average 
pay duration (executive vega) is below the median. The second difference pertains to 
whether a firm is affected by the exogenous shock. According to Gormley and Matsa 
(2011), firms with an SIC code 3674 belong to the “treatment group”, while other firms 
with an SIC code between 3600 and 3699 (except 3674) belong to the “control 
group”12. The third difference arises from the time dimension – whether the observation 
belongs to the epoch before or after the exogenous shock which occurred in 2000. In 
Table 1-5 I report the sample distributions based on the three differences.  
[Insert Table 1-5 about here] 
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  (5) 
Here i indicates firm and t indicates time in years, and high_durationi (high_vegai), 
treati, and afteri are dummy variables of the first, second, and third difference, 
12 According to the definition of U.S. Department of Labor, the 2-digit SIC code of 36 represent an 
industry that specializes in “electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer 
equipment”. 
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respectively. The key coefficient of interest is 1β , which I expect to be positive based 
on the analysis above. 
 
4.5.3. Empirical Results from DID Models 
Table 1-6 reports the regression results for the DID model, which examines how 
vega and pay duration react to the exogenous shock. The estimates presented in 
columns (1) through (3) suggest that CEOs from treated firms receive less vega 
following the unexpected increase in corporate risks. Depending on model specification, 
the decrease in vega ranges from 46.04 (in $000s) to 72.07 (in $000s), or equivalently 
0.10 to 0.15 standard deviations, is statistically significant. The estimates for pay 
duration are not statistically significant. The results suggest that while the executives in 
the treated firms experience a decline in vega after the sudden shock, their pay duration 
exhibits little change following the QNE. Consequently, the pay duration results from 
the DIDID models shall not be interpreted as causal. 
[Insert Table 1-6 about here] 
Panel A of Table 1-7 presents the results from estimating the DIDID model with 
equation (4). The estimated coefficients are positive and significant, indicating that 
longer pay duration is associated with more exploratory innovation.  
[Insert Table 1-7 about here] 
In Panel B, I report the results from estimating equation (5) where the 
exploratory innovation efforts are regressed on the three differences as well as CEO and 
firm characteristics. Although the estimated coefficients of 1β from the panel regression 
fixed effect model becomes insignificant, those from the Tobit estimations are positive 
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and statistically significant. The Tobit results support the notion that CEOs with higher 
executive vega exert higher effort in exploratory innovations. 
 
4.5.4. Parallel Trends Assumption and Placebo Tests 
In order to have consistent estimators from DID models, the “parallel trends 
assumption” has to be satisfied. The assumption states that the change in the response 
variable would have been the same for both the treated and the control group in the 
absence of treatment. This means that if the quasi-natural experiment did not occur, the 
exploratory innovation activity should have been the same for all firms regardless of 
their incentive level and treatment assignment.  
While the “parallel trends assumption” cannot be directly tested, I conduct 
paired t-tests suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013) to evaluate if the assumption is 
likely to be violated in my quasi-natural experiment setting. The tests compare various 
firm characteristics prior to the shock in 2000 along three dimensions, namely pay 
duration, vega, and treatment assignment. If firms are similar in characteristics along 
these classifications, it is unlikely that they would respond differently had the event not 
occurred. Results from the paired t-tests in Table A.1 largely support the notion that 
firms possess similar characteristics in the pre-treatment period. In other words, it is 
unlikely that my DID findings would be contaminated by violations of the “parallel 
trends assumption”. 
In addition to the paired t-tests, I perform a placebo (falsification) test to 
establish that the DID results are unique to the unexpected shock occurred in 2000. The 
placebo test uses year 2001, instead of year 2000 when the shock actually took place, as 
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the event year. I repeat the baseline experiment for both the DID and the DIDID models 
with the same treated and control firms in my real tests. Results are reported in Table 
A.2. The estimated coefficients of the treatment effect (i.e. 1β  in Eqn. 3, 4, &5) are 
statistically insignificant in all cases (highlighted numbers), which indicates the changes 
in CEO incentives and corporate exploratory innovation efforts are similar between the 
treated and the control groups. Overall, the placebo tests lend support to the notion that 
the treated and control firms behave similarly in innovative activities in all periods other 
than the event window in 2000.  
 
5. Additional Robustness Tests 
5.1.Exploratory Innovation and Cash Flow Volatility 
In this subsection, I investigate the empirical validity of Manso’s (2011) 
theoretical model which suggests that exploratory innovation leads to higher corporate 
risks. Following Bakke et al. (2015) I use cash flow volatility to proxy for corporate 
risks, and I calculate cash flow volatility as the standard deviation of quarterly net cash 
flows from investing activities over total assets. Specifically, for firm i in year t, I obtain 
eight quarters of net cash flows from investment activities, scaled by total assets, in year 
t and year t+1. I then calculate the standard deviation of the eight quarterly ratios. My 
estimate regression coefficients from the following model. 
ititititit CEOFirmExploreLvolCF εηγβα +++++= .1                                 (6) 
CF vol refers to cash flow volatility, L.Explore refers to lagged corporate exploratory 
innovation efforts. Firm and CEO are two vectors of control variables on firm 
characteristics and CEO characteristics.  
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[Insert Table 1-8 about here] 
Regression results are presented in Table 1-8, which show that increases in 
previous exploratory innovation activities do lead to future increase in cash flow 
volatilities. The estimates are both statistically and economically significant. For 
example, the estimated coefficient from specification (1) suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in exploratory ratio leads to 0.047 units (or equivalently, 0.99 standard 
deviation) increase in my cash flow volatility measure. My results remain robust when I 
use twelve quarters, instead of eight quarters, or cash flows to calculate standard 
deviations. The results lend support to Manso’s (2011) predictions. That is exploratory 
innovation activities is associated with increasing corporate risks in general. 
 
5.2.Other Measures of Exploratory Innovation Activities 
My current empirical characterization on exploratory innovation stems from 
Benner and Tushman (2002) and Gao et. al (2014), in which I define firm i’s 
exploratory ratio in year t as the number of exploratory patents applied for in year t to 
year t+2 divided by the total number of patents applied for over the same period. In this 
subsection, I investigate whether my main results are robust to alternative measures on 
exploratory innovation. More specifically, I first replace the year [t to t+2] window in 
the above exploratory ratio calculation with three alternative windows: (a) year [t to 
t+1]; (b) year [t] only; and (c) year [t-1 to t+1]13. Then I rerun the 2SLS model with 
these alternative exploratory ratios as the new dependent variable. Results are reported 
in Table 1-9. 
13 Take alternative (a) for example, my exploratory ratio is calculated as the number of exploratory 
patents applied for in year t to year t+1 divided by the total number of patents applied for over year t to 
year t+1. Measures based on alternatives (b) and (c) are calculated in a similar manner.  
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[Insert Table 1-9 about here] 
The estimated coefficients in Table 1-9 are quantitatively similar to those in 
Table 1-4, of which the exploratory ratio is measured over a period of year t to year t+2. 
The regression results and statistical significance in Table 1-9 remain large the same. 
For example, a one year increase in pay duration, or equivalently increasing pay 
duration from the 50th percentile to roughly the 70th percentile, leads to a significant 
increase in exploratory ratio by 14.41 percentage points in model (1) of Table 1-9. This 
result is comparable to the estimation of 13.87 percentage points in model (1) of Table 
1-4. Overall, Table 1-9 suggests that my main results, that longer pay duration and 
higher vega can lead to more exploratory innovation, are robust to alternative measures 
of exploratory activities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Literature on executive short-termism suggests that a short-termist CEO may 
over emphasize short-term corporate goals by reducing long-term risky investment, 
such as R&D, which jeopardizes a firm’s long-term benefits. In this paper, I investigate 
the empirical link between CEO incentives from compensation package and corporate 
innovation strategies. I find that CEOs with longer pay duration, hence less short-term 
pressure, tend to increase their firm’s involvement in exploratory innovation activities. 
Furthermore, CEOs with higher executive vega also direct their firms into innovations 
that tend to be more exploratory than exploitative in nature. Results from the two-stage-
least-squares regressions suggest that the findings are not driven by endogeneity. The 
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DID findings for pay duration, which show no significant difference between the treated 
and the control group, are interesting and worth further investigations.  
This paper establishes the importance of managerial incentives in the 
determination of corporate innovation. While many previous studies have identified 
factors that influence innovation at corporate and industry level, this paper highlights 
the importance of including managerial incentives as a consideration. Another 
interesting question for future research is which innovation strategy, exploratory or 
exploitative, is beneficial to the shareholders.  
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Appendix 1-1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Detailed Definitions 
Explore60 (80) 
This measure is constructed following Benner and Tushman (2002) and 
Gao et. al (2014). First, for each patent applied for by firm i in year t to 
year t+2, I calculate the percentage of its citations that are based on 
existing expertise – either citing the firm’s own patents or citing the 
patents that firm has cited before. Second, a patent is considered 
“exploratory” if 60% (80%) or more of its citations come from outside 
the firm’s existing expertise, which is defined in the first step. Lastly, I 
calculate firm i’s exploratory ratio in year t as the number of 
exploratory patents applied for in year t to year t+2 divided by the total 
number of patents applied for over the same period. 
Pay duration 
The weighted average of the vesting periods of the different 
components of executive pay, with the weight for each component 
being the fraction of that component in the total compensation package. 
Algebraically, the measure is calculated as 
∑∑
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where i and j represent a restricted stock grant and an option grant, 
respectively. Salary, bonus, restricted stocki, and optionj are, 
respectively, dollar value of annual salary, dollar value of annual bonus, 
the value of restricted stock grant i with vesting period ti (in years), and 
the Black-Scholes value of option grant j with vesting period tj (in 
years). 
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Executive vega 
The dollar change in CEO wealth (in $000s) associated with a 0.01 
change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. 
Executive Delta 
The dollar change in CEO wealth (in $000s) associated with a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price. 
CEO tenure 
The number of years between the current fiscal year and the year the 
executive became CEO. 
Firm age 
The number of years between the current fiscal year and the year the 
firm went public. 
Leverage 
Total debt, including debt in current liabilities and long-term debt, 
relative to total assets. 
R&D R&D expenditures relative to total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures relative to total assets. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as EBIT divided by total assets. 
PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment, relative to total assets 
Sales Growth Sales (t) / sales (t-1) 
CEO Comp 
Cmt Chair 
A dummy variable. It equals to 1 when the current CEO serves as the 
chair of the compensation committee. 
Comp Cmt Size The number of members in the compensation committee 
High_duratoin 
A dummy variable. It equals to 1 when the average pay duration for a 
CEO before 2000 is above the sample median 
High_vega 
A dummy variable. It equals to 1 when the average executive vega for a 
CEO before 2000 is above the sample median. 
Treat 
A dummy variable for the treatment group in the DID tests. It equals to 
1 when a firm belongs to SIC code 3674, and it equals to 0 if the SIC 
falls between 3600 and 3699 except 3674.  
39 
After 
A dummy variable. It equals to 1 when an observation belongs to fiscal 
year after 2000. 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of quarterly net cash flows from investing activities 
over total assets. For cash flow volatility in year t, 8 quarterly net cash 
flows from investing activities (4 from year t, and another 4 from year 
t+1) are used to calculate the standard deviation. 
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Appendix 1-2: GLM Regressions 
In subsection 4.3, I estimate the baseline multivariate model using Tobit and 
panel regressions. There are two potential problems associated with the baseline 
multivariate model: a) the dependent variable, exploratory ratio, is bounded between 0 
and 1, and b) there may exist unobserved firm- and year-specific factors that cannot be 
controlled for. While the Tobit analysis takes care of the former problem and produces 
predicted values between 0 and 1, it is unable to deal with the latter. Similarly, the panel 
regression analysis corrects the latter problem by adding firm- and year- fixed effects, 
but its predicted values are not bounded. In this subsection, I propose a third method, 
the Generalized Linear Models (GLM), to account for both problems.  
Papke and Wooldrige (2008) propose a panel data method for fractional 
dependent variables, in which the dependent variables 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are bounded between 0 and 1 
with the following distribution:  
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) = 𝛷𝛷(𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝜷𝜷 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇, 
where 𝛷𝛷(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf), 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a set of 
explanatory variables, and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 represents the unobserved effect. While the derivations of 
the methodology is detailed in their 13-page long manuscript, repetition of such 
derivations is unnecessary and irrelevant to the main focus of this paper. Using the 
built-in functions of Papke and Wooldrige (2008) methodology in statistical software 
packages, I obtained the GLM estimators of the following equation:  
itti
ititititit
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The GLM regression results are presented in Table A.3, which are qualitatively 
similar to the results from the Tobit and panel regressions presented in Table 1-3. In 
particular, the statistically significant and positive coefficients on pay duration suggest 
that the longer pay duration is associated with more exploratory innovation activities. 
While the estimates on vega are no longer significant, the signs remain positive which 
are indicative of a positive relationship between vega and exploratory innovation. 
Overall, the GLM results lend support to the main results in Table 1-3 that exploratory 
innovations are increasing with the increase in pay duration and vega. 
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Appendix 1-3: Instrumental Variables 
Suppose I have the equation: 
ttt uxy += β          (i) 
where the variables are written as derivations from their means. Multiplying through by 
xt and summing over t from 1 to T yields 
∑ ∑ ∑+= ttttt uxxyx 2β  
If I divide through by ∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2 I have 
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Notice that the LHS is the OLS estimator ?̂?𝛽, so 
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and taking the expected value of this expression yields 
( )








+=
∑
∑
2
ˆ
t
tt
x
ux
EE ββ .  
I could easily rewrite 
∑ 2t
t
x
x
as 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, so that 𝐸𝐸�?̂?𝛽� = 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐸𝐸[∑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖]. Consequently, when 
the assumption is that the regressor is a fixed variable and as such is uncorrelated with 
the disturbance, I can write 𝐸𝐸[∑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖] = ∑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖). If this were the case, 𝐸𝐸�?̂?𝛽� would 
be 𝛽𝛽 so that my OLS estimator would be unbiased and consistent. But in this research, it 
is my fear that the RHS variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is endogenous and not necessarily independent of 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. To examine the consistency of an OLS estimator under these circumstance, I take 
the plim of equation (ii): 
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I know that 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(∑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
) is the population covariance of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. Furthermore, (∑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡2𝑇𝑇 ) 
is the population variance of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. In this case, covariance of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 cannot be assumed 
to be zero. Hence I cannot write 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�?̂?𝛽� = 𝛽𝛽 and the OLS estimator is seen to be 
inconsistent.  
A general method of obtaining consistent estimates for the parameters of 
endogenous RHS variables is called instrumental variables. Broadly speaking, an 
instrumental variable is a variable that is uncorrelated with the error term but correlated 
with the explanatory variables in the equation. Consider, once again,  
ttt uxy += β  
If I can find a variable 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 that is uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑢, I can get a consistent estimator for 
𝛽𝛽. I replace the condition 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧,𝑢𝑢) = 0 with its sample counterpart 
∑ =− 0)(1 ttt xyzT β . 
This yields,  
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The probability limit of ?̂?𝛽 would be 
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Hence, proving that ?̂?𝛽 is a consistent estimator for 𝛽𝛽. Note that I require 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 to be 
correlated with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 so that 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑍𝑍,𝑋𝑋) ≠ 0.  
The sampling variance of the instrumental variable estimator of the slope is 
given by  
( )2
22
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∑
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where 𝑠𝑠2 is an estimate for the regression error term. Clearly, with only a small 
correlation between Z and X, I may be paying a very high price for consistency.   
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Appendix 1-4: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1-1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 3019 firm-year observations (611 unique firms) from 1998 to 
2006. Data source includes NBER U.S. Patent Citations Database, HBS Patent 
Network, Incentive Lab, ExecuComp, Compustat and RiskMetrics. To be included 
in the sample, a firm is required to have at least one granted patent over the three-
year period from year t-2 to year t. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed definitions 
of all variables. 
  Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 N 
Explore60 0.57 0.25 0.40 0.57 0.75 3019 
Explore80 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.43 0.63 3019 
Pay Duration 2.25 1.77 0.69 2.22 3.41 3019 
Vega (in $000s) 279.88 480.48 54.86 136.63 314.79 3019 
Delta  (in $000s) 3158.54 23153.80 195.52 462.70 1150.72 3019 
CEO age 55.04 7.22 50.00 56.00 60.00 3019 
CEO tenure 5.97 6.46 1.00 4.00 8.00 3019 
Total Assets 15214.24 61563.68 1188.97 2796.07 9891.50 3019 
Firm Age 8.63 5.84 4.00 8.00 12.00 3019 
Leverage 0.23 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.33 3019 
R&D 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.09 3019 
Capex 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 3019 
ROA 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.15 3019 
PPE 0.49 0.34 0.24 0.41 0.65 3019 
Sales growth 1.20 1.04 0.99 1.09 1.21 3019 
CEO Comp Cmt Chair 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 2318 
Comp Cmt Size 3.51 1.30 3.00 3.00 4.00 2318 
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Table 1-2: Univariate Analysis 
 
The table compares the mean values of the key variables across 
subsamples. In Panel A, the subsamples are formed based on pay 
duration; in Panel B, the subsamples are formed based on executive 
vega. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed definitions of all variables. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
and 10% (*) levels. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Comparison Based on pay duration 
Variable 
Below-Median 
pay duration 
Above-Median  
pay duration Difference 
explore60 0.5628 0.5897 -0.0269 *** 
explore80 0.4548 0.4823 -0.0275 *** 
vega 212.20 338.97 -126.77 *** 
delta 3307.40 2715.64 591.76   
Total Assets 15785.13 14044.58 1740.55   
Firm Age 8.46 8.68 -0.22   
Leverage 0.25 0.20 0.04 *** 
R&D 0.05 0.08 -0.02 *** 
Capex 0.05 0.05 0.00   
ROA 0.09 0.09 0.00   
PPE 0.54 0.44 0.10 *** 
Sales growth 1.18 1.22 -0.04   
          
Panel B: Univariate Comparison Based on executive vega 
Variable 
Below-Median  
vega 
Above-Median  
vega Difference 
explore60 0.5451 0.5991 -0.0540 *** 
explore80 0.4383 0.4896 -0.0513 *** 
pay duration 1.86 2.63 -0.77 *** 
delta 2659.00 3659.47 -1000.47   
Total Assets 4406.16 25320.30 -20914.14 *** 
Firm Age 8.16 9.98 -1.81 *** 
Leverage 0.22 0.23 -0.01   
R&D 0.06 0.07 -0.01 ** 
Capex 0.05 0.05 0.01 *** 
ROA 0.08 0.11 -0.03 *** 
PPE 0.50 0.48 0.03 ** 
Sales growth 1.19 1.14 0.06 ** 
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Table 1-3: Baseline Multivariate Estimation 
This table reports the baseline multivariate estimations of the following equation: 
ittiititititit YearFEFirmFEFirmCEOvegadurationExplore εηγββα +++++++= 21  
where i indicates firm and t indicates time in years. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed definitions of all 
variables. Columns (1) - (3) reports the estimates from Tobit regressions with firm and year clustering, and 
columns (4) - (6) reports the estimates from panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects. p-values are 
reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Explore60*1,000 
  Tobit with firm and year clustering   Firm and year fixed effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pay Duration 12.299   10.483***   4.052**   3.568* 
  (0.717)   (0.001)   (0.039)   (0.070) 
Vega   0.046*** 0.041***     0.026** 0.027** 
    (0.004) (0.009)     (0.016) (0.014) 
CEO Tenure 1.495 1.814 1.629   -6.809*** -5.987*** -6.153*** 
  (0.254) (0.563) (0.830)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Delta -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 
  (0.517) (0.975) (0.835)   (0.039) (0.064) (0.042) 
Leverage 29.017 39.785 31.208   31.416 22.985 26.208 
  (0.723) (0.607) (0.816)   (0.344) (0.488) (0.429) 
ROA 24.044 45.326 43.901   -13.463 -12.035 -13.252 
  (0.803) (0.379) (0.825)   (0.721) (0.750) (0.725) 
CAPEX 81.830 -11.157 47.435   369.091*** 356.803*** 365.414*** 
  (0.626) (0.969) (0.778)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PPE -1.155 7.101 -0.686   62.677* 51.468 53.328 
  (0.973) (0.863) (0.984)   (0.070) (0.138) (0.124) 
Sales Growth  0.822 0.855 0.288   12.076** 11.369** 11.648** 
 
(0.877) (0.874) (0.956)   (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
Constant 539.402*** 517.661*** 545.295***   514.008*** 516.027*** 522.656*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3019 3019 3019   3019 3019 3019 
R-squared - - -   0.055 0.055 0.059 
F - - -   8.530 8.626 8.280 
Two-way 
Cluster Y Y Y   N N N 
Firm&Year 
FE N N N   Y Y Y 
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Table 1-3: Baseline Multivariate Estimation – Continued 
 
                
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Explore80*1,000 
  Tobit with firm and year clustering   Firm and year fixed effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pay Duration 12.772   10.889***   3.759**   3.472* 
  (0.499)   (0.000)   (0.048)   (0.069) 
Vega   0.048*** 0.043***     0.015 0.016 
    (0.003) (0.006)     (0.137) (0.135) 
CEO Tenure 1.982 2.307 2.121   -5.827*** -5.281*** -5.439*** 
  (0.157) (0.193) (0.650)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Delta -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.212) (0.606) (0.511)   (0.101) (0.142) (0.106) 
Leverage 48.815 60.263 51.096   43.203 36.995 40.121 
  (0.525) (0.194) (0.617)   (0.178) (0.249) (0.211) 
ROA 30.910 52.692 51.511   26.563 27.583 26.688 
  (0.767) (0.527) (0.724)   (0.467) (0.450) (0.464) 
CAPEX 125.613 28.877 89.953   333.528*** 322.800*** 331.352*** 
  (0.466) (0.907) (0.600)   (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
PPE -22.810 -14.439 -22.329   62.612* 55.140 57.079* 
  (0.518) (0.647) (0.620)   (0.061) (0.100) (0.089) 
Sales Growth -0.352 -0.287 -0.903   8.207* 7.692* 7.954* 
  (0.939) (0.953) (0.862)   (0.076) (0.096) (0.085) 
Constant 428.140*** 405.627*** 434.246***   393.558*** 392.388*** 398.676*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3019 3019 3019   3019 3019 3019 
R-squared - - -   0.046 0.044 0.048 
F - - -   7.122 6.798 6.587 
Two-way 
Cluster Y Y Y   N N N 
Firm&Year FE N N N   Y Y Y 
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Table 1-4: 2SLS Regression Results 
This table reports regression results from estimating the following equation using 2-stage-least-square 
methodology: 
ittiititititit YearFEFirmFEFirmCEOvegadurationExplore εηγββα +++++++= 21  
where i indicates firm and t indicates time in years. The endogenous variables are duration and vega, and the 
instrumental variables are 1) a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the compensation 
committee, and 2) the compensation committee size. p-values are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table 1-5: Summary Statistics on the Natural Experiment 
 
This table reports the number of firms in each group of the natural experiment. The 
sample only includes firms with an SIC from 3600 to 3699. Among them, firms with an 
SIC of 3674 belong to the treatment group, while others belong to the control group. If a 
CEO's average pay duration before 2000 is below (above) the median duration of all 
CEOs in this sample, her firm belongs to the low- (high-) duration group. Similarly, If a 
CEO's average executive vega before 2000 is below (above) the median executive vega of 
all CEOs in this sample, her firm belongs to the low- (high-) executive vega group. 
 
  Duration   Vega   Treatment 
fiscal 
year low_duration high_duration   low_vega high_vega   
treatment 
group 
control 
group 
1998 21 24   18 27   24 21 
1999 29 28   29 28   29 28 
2000 30 29   29 30   29 30 
2001 29 27   26 30   27 29 
2002 27 28   25 30   25 30 
2003 28 27   26 29   26 29 
2004 27 28   26 29   26 29 
2005 24 22   22 24   21 25 
2006 8 9   5 12   8 9 
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Table 1-6: Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
This table reports the Differences-in-Differences (DID) estimations of the 
following equation: 
 
                 
ittiit
ittitiit
YearFEFirmFEFirm
CEOaftertreataftertreatIncentive
ε
βββα
++++
++++= 321 *  
 
where i indicates firm and t indicates time in years. The sample only includes 
firms with an SIC code between 3600 and 3699. Firms with an SIC code 3674 
belong to the treatment group (treat), while firms with SIC code between 3600 
and 3699 except 3674 belong to the control group. After is a dummy variable for 
fiscal years after 2000. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed definitions of all 
variables. Columns (1) and (4) report the estimates from OLS regressions, and 
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) report the estimates from panel regressions with firm 
and year fixed effects. p-values are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
Dep = Vega   Dep = Pay Duration 
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FE   (4) OLS (5) FE (6) FE 
-72.069* -46.044* 
-
68.712***   -0.031 -0.067 -0.396 
(0.059) (0.074) (0.009)   (0.938) (0.876) (0.408) 
61.343**       1.084***     
(0.044)       (0.001)     
44.059 65.475*** 70.132***   0.275 0.241 0.067 
(0.104) (0.001) (0.002)   (0.337) (0.478) (0.871) 
    0.005       -0.000 
    (0.106)       (0.105) 
    4.572**       -0.023 
    (0.036)       (0.577) 
    81.843       2.594 
    (0.646)       (0.425) 
    6.559       1.576 
    (0.903)       (0.118) 
    49.749***       -0.056 
    (0.001)       (0.837) 
98.073*** 124.787*** 79.408*   1.855*** 2.421*** 2.097*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.062)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
437 437 437   437 437 437 
0.117 0.157 0.284   0.076 0.006 0.037 
19.117 30.251 12.809   11.624 0.931 1.183 
N Y Y   N Y Y 
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Table 1-7: Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
 
This table reports the Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences (DIDID) estimations of 
the following equations: 
 
ittiititt
iititi
iitiiit
YearFEFirmFEFirmCEOafter
treatdurationhighaftertreatafterdurationhigh
treatdurationhighaftertreatdurationhighExplore
εβ
ββββ
ββα
++++++
++++
++=
7
6543
21
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YearFEFirmFEFirmCEOafter
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21
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where i indicates firm and t indicates time in years. The sample only includes firms with 
an SIC code between 3600 and 3699. Firms with an SIC code 3674 belong to the 
treatment group (treat), while firms with SIC code between 3600 and 3699 except 3674 
belong to the control group. After is a dummy variable for fiscal years after 2000. 
High_duration is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm's average duration 
before 2000 is above the median of all firms in sample. Appendix 1-1 documents the 
detailed definitions of all variables. Columns (1) and (3) report the estimates from Tobit 
regressions with firm and year clustering, and columns (2) and (4) report the estimates 
from panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects. p-values are reported in the 
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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Table 1-7: Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Analysis – Continued  
  
Panel A: Effect of Duration 
  Dep Var = Explore60*1,000   
Dep Var = 
Explore80*1,000 
  (1) Tobit (2) FE   (3) Tobit (4) FE 
high_duration*treat*after 57.043** 91.216**   66.722* 79.258* 
  (0.029) (0.050)   (0.058) (0.084) 
high_duration*treat  17.791     -21.311   
  (0.836)     (0.820)   
high_duration*after -30.112 -68.683*   -42.944 -77.070** 
  (0.466) (0.062)   (0.332) (0.034) 
treat*after -28.509 -58.686*   -9.392 -44.082 
  (0.173) (0.067)   (0.484) (0.164) 
high_duration 35.778     50.074   
  (0.577)     (0.484)   
treat -11.694     20.684   
  (0.833)     (0.731)   
after -65.043*** -15.925   -73.914*** -29.829 
  (0.001) (0.524)   (0.003) (0.228) 
duration 1.675 4.159   1.337 5.322* 
  (0.611) (0.168)   (0.645) (0.075) 
vega -0.081 0.012   -0.144 0.048 
  (0.476) (0.819)   (0.268) (0.350) 
delta 0.002 0.000   -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.624) (0.898)   (0.901) (0.921) 
CEO tenure 0.534 -2.334   1.187 -3.024 
  (0.820) (0.248)   (0.645) (0.130) 
leverage -0.754 -114.133*   -11.821 -130.406** 
  (0.994) (0.059)   (0.915) (0.029) 
CAPEX -8.544 301.894*   43.225 309.334** 
  (0.981) (0.056)   (0.911) (0.048) 
Constant 669.485*** 585.250***   572.572*** 478.880*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 445 445   445 445 
R-squared - 0.187   - 0.237 
F - 5.808   - 7.828 
Two-way Cluster Y N   Y N 
Firm FE N Y   N Y 
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Table 1-7: Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Analysis – Continued  
 
 Panel B: Effect of Vega 
  Dep Var = Explore60*1,000   
Dep Var = 
Explore80*1,000 
  (1) Tobit (2) FE   (3) Tobit (4) FE 
high_vega*treat*after 131.680** 50.739   139.397* 74.567 
  (0.034) (0.295)   (0.067) (0.118) 
high_vega*treat  -91.683     -105.445   
  (0.307)     (0.353)   
high_vega*after 9.875 27.777   8.076 14.800 
  (0.796) (0.455)   (0.877) (0.686) 
treat*after -106.979** -59.522*   -92.949* -66.881* 
  (0.043) (0.088)   (0.082) (0.051) 
high_vega -125.970**     -140.638**   
  (0.014)     (0.012)   
treat 98.505**     127.130**   
  (0.047)     (0.045)   
after -120.203*** -54.403**   -142.903*** -66.648*** 
  (0.000) (0.027)   (0.000) (0.006) 
duration 4.917 4.842*   4.199 6.600** 
  (0.275) (0.099)   (0.359) (0.023) 
vega 0.119 -0.009   0.068 0.015 
  (0.278) (0.861)   (0.564) (0.762) 
delta -0.000 -0.001   -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.941) (0.833)   (0.453) (0.731) 
CEO tenure 0.731 -2.422   1.695 -2.959 
  (0.701) (0.227)   (0.438) (0.134) 
leverage 27.206 -132.708**   3.506 -148.764** 
  (0.796) (0.027)   (0.975) (0.012) 
CAPEX -625.246* 259.667*   -813.580** 259.657* 
  (0.090) (0.100)   (0.030) (0.095) 
Constant 711.404*** 635.786***   616.615*** 520.806*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 445 445   445 445 
R-squared - 0.186   - 0.241 
F - 6.339   - 8.850 
Two-way Cluster Y N   Y N 
Firm FE N Y   N Y 
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Table 1-8: Cash Flow Volatility and Exploratory Innovation 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression model:  
 
ititititit CEOFirmExploreLvolCF εηγβα +++++= .1                              (6) 
 
CF vol refers to cash flow volatility, L.Explore refers to lagged corporate 
exploratory innovation efforts. Firm and CEO are two vectors of control 
variables on firm characteristics and CEO characteristics. Appendix 1-1 
documents the detailed definitions of all variables, and subsection 5.1 discusses 
the detailed empirical implications. Estimates in colums (1) and (3) are obtained 
from panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects; estimates in columns 
(2) and (4) are obtained from OLS regressions with two-way clustering (firm 
and year clustering). p-values are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
 
  Dep = CF Vol (8 qtr)   Dep = CF Vol (12 qtr) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Explore 60 (Lagged) 0.047*** 0.014**   0.040*** 0.014* 
  (0.000) (0.034)   (0.000) (0.062) 
ROA -0.081*** -0.074***   -0.079*** -0.102*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.013 0.149***   0.056** 0.167*** 
  (0.625) (0.000)   (0.032) (0.000) 
Sales Growth -0.001 0.007   -0.010*** 0.002 
  (0.597) (0.146)   (0.000) (0.595) 
Vega -0.000* -0.000***   -0.000** -0.000*** 
  (0.093) (0.009)   (0.022) (0.001) 
Delta 0.000*** 0.000**   0.000* 0.000** 
  (0.007) (0.028)   (0.062) (0.045) 
Constant 0.037*** 0.037***   0.056*** 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2405 2405   2405 2405 
R-squared 0.053 0.114   0.079 0.138 
F 17.946 22.820   27.866 29.167 
Two-way Cluster N Y   N Y 
Firm FE Y N   Y N 
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Table A 1: Pre-Treatment Firm Characteristics Comparison 
 
This table reports the mean values from paired t-tests on firm characteristics 
during pre-treatment period. The sample period covers from 1998 to 2000. Firms 
are grouped based upon incentive levels (pay duration and vega) and upon 
treatment groups. A firm-year observation is assigned to low duration (vega) 
group if its CEO's pay duration (vega) is below the sample median prior to 2000; 
a firm-year observation is assigned to high duration (vega) group if its CEO's pay 
duration (vega) is above the sample median prior to 2000. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
Panel A: Comparison Based upon Pay Duration 
Variable Low Duration High  Duration Difference 
log(assets) 7.316 7.367 -0.051   
Firm Age 6.892 10.104 -3.212 ** 
Leverage 0.160 0.102 0.057 ** 
R&D 0.074 0.099 -0.025 *** 
Capex 0.087 0.082 0.005   
ROA 0.140 0.139 0.001   
PPE 0.520 0.400 0.119 *** 
Sales growth 1.349 1.400 -0.051   
          
Panel B: Comparison Based upon vega 
Variable Low Vega High Vega Difference 
log(assets) 6.674 7.939 -1.265 *** 
Firm Age 6.809 11.053 -4.244 *** 
Leverage 0.124 0.137 -0.014   
R&D 0.085 0.088 -0.004   
Capex 0.093 0.076 0.017 * 
ROA 0.154 0.126 0.027   
PPE 0.440 0.477 -0.037   
Sales growth 1.408 1.344 0.064   
          
Panel C: Comparison Based upon TreatmentGroups 
Variable Control Group Treated Group Difference 
log(assets) 7.425 7.255 0.171   
Firm Age 7.079 10.021 -2.942 * 
Leverage 0.133 0.128 0.005   
R&D 0.073 0.100 -0.027 *** 
Capex 0.072 0.097 -0.026 *** 
ROA 0.143 0.135 0.008   
PPE 0.431 0.489 -0.058   
Sales growth 1.328 1.423 -0.096   
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Table A 2: Placebo Tests 
This table reports the results from the Placebo tests. The estimates in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4), 
and correspond to Eqn. (3), (3), (5), and (4), respectively. The highlighted numbers are the estimates 
for 1β  in aforementioned equations. The sample only includes firms with an SIC code between 3600 
and 3699. Firms with an SIC code 3674 belong to the treatment group (treat), while firms with SIC 
code between 3600 and 3699 except 3674 belong to the control group. After is a dummy variable for 
fiscal years after 2000. High_duration is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm's average 
duration before 2000 is above the median of all firms in sample. Appendix 1-1 documents the 
detailed definitions of all variables. All estimates are obtained from panel regressions with firm and 
year fixed effects. p-values are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Control variables on CEO characteristics and 
firm characteristics are not reported to conserve space.  
              
  DID   DIDID 
        Incentive = vega   
Incentive = pay 
duration 
Dependent Variable  
(1) vega 
 
(2) pay 
duration   
(3)  Explore 60 
   
(4) Explore 60 
 
high_incentive*treat*after       21.927   50.652 
        (0.637)   (0.257) 
high_incentive*treat        .   . 
        .   . 
high_incentive*after       30.133   -23.557 
        (0.392)   (0.497) 
treat*after 40.018 0.079   -14.054   -21.193 
  (0.132) (0.864)   (0.678)   (0.509) 
high_incentive       .   . 
        .   . 
treat . .   .   . 
  . .   .   . 
after 45.154** -0.234   -58.066**   -35.790 
  (0.043) (0.542)   (0.017)   (0.154) 
duration       3.619   3.381 
        (0.226)   (0.277) 
Constant 142.200*** 2.221***   635.044***   585.764*** 
  (0.001) (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Observations 394 394   394   394 
R-squared 0.203 0.032   0.157   0.159 
F 8.227 1.036   5.186   4.758 
Two-way Cluster N N   N   N 
Firm FE Y Y   Y   Y 
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Table A 3: GLM Regression Results on the Baseline Multivariate Model 
 
This table reports the results from using GLM regressions to estimate the baseline multivariate 
model below: 
ittiititititit YearFEFirmFEFirmCEOvegadurationExplore εηγββα +++++++= 21  
where i indicates firm and t indicates time in years. Appendix 1-1 documents the detailed 
definitions of all variables, and Appendix 1-2 discusses the rationale for using GLM 
regressions. p-values are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
level at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
 
  Dep var = Explore60   Dep var = Explore80 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pay Duration 0.034**   0.030*   0.036**   0.031* 
  (0.033)   (0.064)   (0.025)   (0.052) 
Vega   0.000 0.000     0.000* 0.000 
    (0.104) (0.155)     (0.080) (0.111) 
CEO Tenure 0.004 0.005 0.004   0.005 0.006 0.006 
  (0.535) (0.417) (0.497)   (0.374) (0.293) (0.340) 
Delta -0.000* -0.000 -0.000   -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.094) (0.299) (0.238)   (0.047) (0.150) (0.125) 
Leverage 0.004 0.032 0.010   0.115 0.140 0.122 
  (0.985) (0.883) (0.964)   (0.594) (0.521) (0.572) 
ROA -0.376 -0.325 -0.332   -0.291 -0.242 -0.242 
  (0.199) (0.262) (0.253)   (0.298) (0.383) (0.384) 
CAPEX -0.590 -0.767 -0.619   -0.446 -0.658 -0.479 
  (0.579) (0.469) (0.559)   (0.690) (0.555) (0.668) 
PPE 0.041 0.064 0.039   0.035 0.058 0.033 
  (0.757) (0.637) (0.770)   (0.791) (0.664) (0.804) 
Sales Growth 0.016 0.017 0.016   0.032 0.034 0.032 
  (0.647) (0.605) (0.652)   (0.384) (0.340) (0.387) 
Constant -0.069 -0.128 0.066   -0.560*** -0.616*** -0.430*** 
  (0.569) (0.265) (0.578)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3019 3019 3019   3019 3019 3019 
Firm&Year 
FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
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Figure 1-1: Differences-in-Differences (DID) Illustration 
 
This figure illustrates the general idea behind a DID model. The treated group and the 
control group is represented by lines T and C, respectively. The outcome variable Y is 
measured both before and after the QNE. Note that not all the difference between the 
treated and the control groups after the QNE (i.e., the difference between y12 and y22) 
can be attributed to the treatment because the different already exists even before the 
QNE. The DID only considers the “additional” difference (i.e., the difference between 
y12 and y22’) as the treatment effect. 
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Chapter 2: Expected Time to a Special Purpose Acquisition 
Corporation (SPAC) Merger14 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporations receive many benefits by going public.  Besides the obvious reason 
of raising capital, studies such as Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Brau and 
Fawcett (2006), and Maug (1998) have found that public firms have a lower cost of 
capital, make more acquisitions, have higher valuations and more effective corporate 
governance than private firms.  However, a firm’s initial public offering (IPO) has 
significant financial costs (such as underwriting fees) that are well documented in 
Ibottson, Ritter and Sindelar (1998) and Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996). 
Recently many private firms have been seeking alternative, less expensive, ways to go 
public. Many corporations have opted to go public via a reverse merger.15 A reverse 
merger is where a larger private firm merges with a smaller publicly traded firm, 
sometimes with little or no physical assets; the private firms take over the publicly 
traded entity of the smaller firm, thereby “going public” without the IPO. The smaller 
public firm is often referred to as a “shell” when it has no operations. The literature in 
mergers and acquisition is extensive, while the research in the field of reverse mergers 
is surging. Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins (2006) and Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal 
(2006) provide two excellent introductions to this topic. In response to the demand for 
shells or publicly traded entities for facilitating reverse mergers, special purpose 
14 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Bryan E. Stanhouse. 
15 CFO Magazine, “Honest Shell Games?” April 2005. 
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acquisition corporations (SPACs) have grown in popularity over the last ten years.16 A 
SPAC is a “blank check” company, or in other words, a company created for the 
specific purpose to merge or form a business combination with a private firm looking to 
become publicly traded.17 It has no business operations. 
SPACs have a variety of interesting characteristics. SPAC units, rather than 
straight equity, are sold to the public. These units usually contain one share and one or 
two warrants. The common stock and the warrants usually begin to trade separately on 
the 90th day after the units begin trading. According to Schultz (1993), firms that issue 
units are smaller, have less income than other firms their size, and less likely to survive. 
The warrants can be exercised within one year from the IPO date, and expire in four 
years, with various restrictions. The units, warrants and shares are listed on the same 
exchange, either the OTC Bulletin Board Market (OTCBB) or the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX). SPAC underwriting spreads are slightly larger than most IPOs, and 
much larger if one includes a deferred underwriting fee and purchase option.18 The 
largest fees are paid by the smaller SPACs19. All the completed mergers end up on the 
NASDSAQ Global Market or Capital Market rather than the OTCBB, where many 
SPACs begin.20,21   
16 They are also known as TACs, or targeted acquisition corporations.   
17 SPACs are not technically “blank check” firms as defined by the SEC rule 419; a firm can avoid the 
onerous restrictions of Rule 419 by filing an 8K form, having an audited balance sheet and at least $5 
million in net assets. 
18 Most IPOs cost 7% as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000). 
19 This is consistent with the findings of Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2006) that low reputation firms 
seek low reputation investment banks and pay accordingly. 
20 See nasdaq.com for detail on these leading over-the-counter markets. 
21 Harris, Panchapegasan and Werner (2006) find that the OTCBB market has lower volume and three 
times the effective spread than the NASDAQ; potential merger partners may view the SPAC merger as 
preferred to the standard reverse merger with a shell that lingers on the OTCBB. 
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The SPAC places the cash from the IPO in a trust account and only spends 
proceeds on the expenses associated with maintaining the firm. There is evidence that 
investors are demanding more money in the trust account. Over time the amount in the 
trust account has grown, on average, from 90% to 95% of net assets. 
Once the SPAC managers find an acquisition target, the majority of shareholders 
must approve the deal and less than 20% of the shareholders are allowed to exercise 
their redemption option. The redemption option is a put option that the shareholder can 
exercise that allows them to redeem their shares with the company at the NAV which 
typically is about 95% of IPO price.  Shareholders can also sell in the open market. 
Occurrences of SPACs selling below their NAV are rare. 
Perhaps the most important feature of a SPAC is the “merger window”; that is 
the time period stated in the prospectus when a merger must take place, or the 
manager’s shares become worthless and the NAV is returned to the shareholders in 
cash. The merger window typically extends twenty four months from the IPO date; the 
firm must have a letter of intent to effect a merger by this time, but some SPACs have 
as little as 18 months to consummate a deal.22 Firms that announce mergers early in the 
window generally outperform firms that announce later in the window. Equity returns 
get worse and worse the longer firms wait before reaching any agreement. If a majority 
of shareholders vote against the merger agreement, or if 20% of shareholders exercise 
their redemption option, the SPAC may ask for more time to find a partner. If 
shareholders reject that offer, the SPAC liquidates and initial investors receive the NAV 
(net asset value) of the company. In other words, the money in the trust account is 
returned. The NAV is reported every quarter in the 10-Q SEC filing. SPAC managers 
22 Firms may even ask shareholders for an extension of this window. 
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can go to the shareholders and ask for an extension to the merger window before a vote 
takes place23.   
According to each SPAC prospectus, the merger target must be at least 80% of 
the net assets of the SPAC. The managers or the executive officers of the SPAC have 
the job of selecting a merger partner. The managers receive no salary compensation for 
their work; instead they are allowed to purchase a 20% stake in the firm for a minimal 
cost (usually 1 cent per share) before the initial public offering (IPO) and the public is 
sold the remaining 80% in return for their willingness to fund the SPAC, i.e., buy the 
IPO units. It is important to know that the manager’s shares are restricted, “lock-up” 
fashion. While the public’s shares and warrants are easily tradable in the market, 
manager’s shares are restricted for 3 years or unless all the shares are exchanged for 
cash in ‘the terms” of a merger agreement24. Management also puts some “skin in the 
game” by agreeing to purchase warrants in the open market or via a private placement 
in conjunction with the IPO. SPACs have a board of directors; many on the board own 
shares in the company; the board is composed of executive officers and independent 
directors.  It is important to note that although the SPAC is almost completely funded 
by outside investors, those investors only own, on average, 80% of the firm, 
demonstrating the significant dilution of the ownership rights of those IPO investors. 
 
23 Shareholders can still exercise the right to reject the merger agreement even if they vote for an 
extension. 
24 Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that these lock-up agreements are designed to alleviate the moral 
hazard problem by insiders. 
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2. A Simple Target Acquisition Model for SPAC Managers 
In this section we propose a simple target acquisition model for SPAC 
managers. The model’s intent is to merely create a sense of how SPAC managers might 
think about merger targets in order to help determine what economic variables, and how 
those variables, impact a SPAC’s time to merger. 
We begin by detailing just how much of the new firm’s value SPAC managers 
would be entitled to at the time a merger is consummated which is given by  
. 
The proportion of the new firm’s value that the original SPAC owns is given by 
, while [1-P] is the fraction of the SPAC that managers own. The product of [1-P] 
is the proportion SPAC managers are entitled to at the time the SPAC and the target are 
merged.  is the money the SPAC raises with IPO, T is the true market value of the 
merger target, and C is the cost of running the SPAC until the merger is effectuated. 
Our model assumes that  is given deterministically while both T and C are only 
available stochastically. Each private firm in the target industry has only one true value 
“t” relevant to the acquirer and it is not easily discernible. When the targets are 
considered in cross section they create a pdf for T, f(t).25,26 C is the cost of running the 
SPAC until a target is acquired. The rate of which these costs are accrued is “vc.” For 
the SPAC this would be the day to day expenses of running a publicly traded firm: rent 
for office space, insurance, listing fees with the exchanges, filing fees with the SEC, 
25 T is net of any debt occasioned by the purchase of the target.  
26 , P and  are treated as being deterministically given in this analysis. 
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payments to auditors, etc. While “vc” is not random, the length of time the SPAC must 
incur these expenses is unknown, making C a random variable 
C = vc  (TM) 
where TM = Time to Merger. 
We presume that candidate targets for merger are made aware to the SPAC 
managers according to a Poisson process. A random variable distributed according to 
the Poisson has a mean number of occurrences equal to  and a likelihood of 
occurrence which is given by
)!(#
#
soccurrenceof
e soccurrenceofλλ− .27 
We assume that SPAC managers maximize the expected value of their share of 
the new firm by employing a policy of accepting the first target that has a “t” which is 
greater than some minimum value M, . To determine the optimal value of M, SPAC 
management would consider 
( ){ }[ ]MTCTIPE ct >−+− 0, 1α   
or 
( ) { }[ ]MTCTIEP ct >−+− 0,1α  
as their objective function.28 Distributing the expectation operator yields 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { }MTCEPMTTEPIP ctct >−−>−+− ,,0 111 ααα . 
which can eventually be written as  
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { }CEPMTTEPIP ct −−>−+− 111 0 ααα  
27 Occurrences in our model would be the arrival of private firms within the purview of the SPAC but the 
target would not necessarily be acceptable to SPAC managers.   
28 Constants pass through expectation operators.  
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where { } [ ] dttMTTE MF tf
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where . 
While the expected value of T is straight forward, the determination of  
is a little more subtle, with C being the product of “vc” and the time to merger. Our 
evaluation of the mean of C takes advantage of a relationship between Poisson and 
exponentially distributed variables in order to make the analysis temporal. In particular, 
we let τY  be equal to the number of occurrences (arrival of merger targets) during a 
time interval  let’s say the time to expiration of the SPAC. That is, for any fixed 
interval of time , the random variable is a Poisson process with parameter . 
We assume that  if and only if at least one arrival of a merger target takes 
place and let X be the time to that occurrence, consequently, I have  
( ) ( )ττ >−=≤ XPXP 1  
or 
 
or 
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because the likelihood of zero target arrivals for a variate distributed according to the 
Poisson is .29 
If  and { } ∫≡≤
τ
τ
0
)( dxxfXP  then λτ
τ
−−=∫ edxxf 1)(
0
. So 
( ) ( ) λττ −−=− eFF 10  
or , consequently, . So that  and  
is, by inspection, the probability density function of an exponentially distributed 
variable. 
The expected value of an exponentially distributed random variable is  for 
xexf λλ −=)( . But, according to the analysis that follows, the mean time to acceptance 
of a merger target would be  since the SPAC employs an optimal 
acquisition policy which demands that the target’s “ ” be greater than  which has a 
likelihood of .  
Though targets become available to the SPACs according to a Poisson process 
with a parameter of , there is a constant probability )( *MF  that the appearance of 
a target will not result in an acquisition by the SPAC. That is the target may have a true 
value “t” that is less than the minimum value the SPAC’s optimal merger strategy 
demands. In this case, τ>X  (during the interval ) if and only if no targets arrive, 
29 We think of  as being the monthly rate of arrival and would be 18 or 24 months depending on the 
SPAC. 
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one target arrives but its “t” is less than , two targets appear, but neither have “t” 
values that are greater than , etc. Hence, we have 
)(1)( ττ >−=≤ XPXP . Recall 
( )
)!(#
)(#
#
occurencesof
eoccurencesofP
occurencesofλτλτ ⋅
=
−
 
( )






+++−=≤
−
−− ...
!2
)]([)()(1)(
2*2
* MFeMFeeXP λτλττ
λτ
λτλτ  
( ) 


 ++++−=≤ − ......)(
2
1)(11)( 2** MFMFeXP λτλττ λτ  
( )][1)(
*MFeeXP λτλττ −−=≤  
( )( )*11)( MFeXP −−−=≤ λττ . 
Thus the likelihood that the SPAC acquires a target before (the time to 
expiration of the SPAC in months) is given by  
( )( )*11)( MFeXP −−−=≤ λττ . 
Putting it all together, the original objective function 
( ) [ ] [ ][ ]CEMTTEIP ct −>+− 01α  
becomes 
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]CEPMTTEPIP ct )1(11 0 −−>−+− ααα  
or 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]MergertoTimevcEPdt
MF
tftPIP c
M
⋅−−
−
−+− ∫
∞
1
)](1[
)(11 0 ααα  
or 
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alternatively 
.
 
Finally, differentiating the expected value of SPAC management’s share of the 
new firm 
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with respect to M yields 
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If we set the partial derivative of the expected value of the SPAC 
management’s share of the new firm equal to zero, we have 
[ ] 0)()(1
*
** =
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Given our ambitious objective function, the optimality condition for the 
minimum acceptable value of a merger target is surprisingly simple and convenient 
mathematically. However, the result can be written more intuitively30. Reconsider  
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or, finally, as 
[ ]TMEvcMTTEM ⋅−>= ][ ** . 
30 The computations in this section employ Leibnitz’s results for taking the derivative of an integral 
whose limits are a function of the variable of differentiation.  
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When the optimality condition is written in this manner, the intuition for *M  is 
clear. The minimum acceptable value of a merger target is the difference in the 
conditional expected value of the acquired target and the expected total cost of running 
the SPAC until an acceptable business partner is found. 
 
3. Comparative Static Behavior of the Expected Time to Merger 
In order to explicate the predictive implications for our empirical analysis, we 
now present a comparative static analysis of the time to merger. Parametric changes 
have a direct and an indirect impact upon E(TM*) that we characterize in the following 
equation: 
iii dq
dM
M
TME
q
TME
dq
TMdE *
*
*** )()()(
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  (i) 
for iq , alternatively, equal to “vc” the cost per unit of time of looking for a 
private firm to merge with, “ ” the standard deviation of the value of firms in the 
target industry, “ ” the mean value of private firms in the target industry and “ ” the 
rate of arrival of targets for the SPAC’s consideration. Clearly, (i) documents the 
immediate impact of the change in iq  upon E(TM*). But the expression also 
acknowledges that the variation in iq will occasion an adjustment of the firm’s decision 
variable M* and a consequent reaction in the expected time to merger. 
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3.1.The Impact of “vc” upon M* and E(TM*) 
In order to find 
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use Leibnitz’s rule in order to explicitly consider the differentiation of the limits as well 
as the integrand31. 
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31 Please see Appendix 2-1 for Leibnitz’s Rule. 
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Our interpretation of this result would be that the higher the costs of looking for 
a merger target (per unit of time), the lower the optimal minimum value of the merger 
target. Furthermore,  
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Consequently, the greater the costs of maintaining the SPAC across time the 
shorter the expected time to merger. 
 
3.2.The Impact of tσ  upon M* and E(TM*) 
In order to find
td
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*
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− . If we assume that T (the true value of 
private firms in the target industry) is normally distributed, then 
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It can be shown for any normally distributed variate X that  
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In addition, for a normally distributed variate, it can be shown that  
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Given the results above, if we now go back to 2/][ tFOC σ∂∂ , then we have  
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which is obviously a positive number. 
So 
t
FOC
σ∂
∂  is a positive number and we have already established that 
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In regard to the implications that this result has for the expected time to 
maturity, we have 
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At this point, all we need is 
t
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In order to simplify the analysis, let’s rewrite f(t) in terms of f(z) the 
standardized normal variate so that 
t
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=  and E[TM*] can now be rewritten as  
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Putting it all together  
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3.3.The Impact of µ  upon M* and E(TM*) 
In order to compute how M* changes when the mean value ( ) of the firms in 
the target industry increase, 
µd
dM * , we totally differentiate the first order condition 
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By expanding, we have  
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Taking the derivative of [x f(x)] with respect to x eventually yields 
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since we have already established that  is a negative number32. 
32 The importance of the comparative static behavior of M* is limited by the fact that the 
optimal value of M is not directly observable and, consequently, its behavior cannot be 
empirically ratified. However, the behavior of M* can be documented by the impact that 
it has upon the expected to merger. 
In regard to the impact of  upon E(TM*), recall 
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That is, as established above, changes in vc, , , and  all change M* and 
the unobserved changes in M* are revealed in E[TM*]. 
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Recall earlier in this manuscript we established that
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because the change in  has both a direct and an indirect impact upon the expected 
time to merger. The indirect effect accounts for the reaction of M* to the change in the 
mean value of the targets. 
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At this point we need to combine our three sets of results to obtain 
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Clearly [ ]µdTMdE /][ *  is zero.  
 
3.4.The Impact of “ ”  upon M* and E(TM*) 
To find out how the optimal value of M* changes with respect to changes in the 
rate  at which merger targets appear to the SPAC,
λd
dM * , we appeal to the implicit 
function theorem once again. Since 
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then M* will rise.  
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In regard to the impact of upon the expected time to merger, we need to 
consider: 
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4. Introduction to Estimation 
Early in this paper, we introduced a SPAC merger model (SMM). By 
maximizing the SPAC’s expected profit function SPAC managers are able to find the 
optimal M*, the minimum value of a target a SPAC would accept as a merger partner. 
Once M* was found it was possible to solve for the expected time to merger E[TM*]. 
The SPAC managerial team sets M* by weighing the potential benefits of the 
target firm value “t” against the intertemporal input costs of waiting for the acceptable 
target to arrive. Each SPAC pays a cost per unit of time as the expiration date 
approaches. Once a merger is official, then the managers can officially begin the 
countdown to the date they can sell some of their equity and realize the profits from 
forming the SPAC. If a SPAC does not announce a merge, then the SPAC is liquidated 
and the managers are left with nothing.  
We would like to know what factors influence a SPAC’s decision to announce a 
pact during the merger window. With the announcement times in hand, we can use a 
statistical model that analyzes the “duration” to a well-defined event such as a SPAC 
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alliance. Known as survival analysis, these models (often called “hazard models”) use 
maximum likelihood estimation to determine the impact of RHS variables upon the time 
to merger announcement by a SPAC. Survival analysis takes into account the likelihood 
of a SPAC reporting a merger at a specific time in the merger window, along with the 
likelihood of the remaining SPACs not announcing a merger at this time. In other 
words, the inclusion of this additional information makes survival analysis the most 
appropriate econometric technique to study the SPAC merger announcements.  
As an introduction to survival analysis consider the following simple example. 
Let T be non-negative random variable that represents the waiting time until a merger 
announcement by a SPAC. T is a continuous random variable with pdf f(t) and cdf 
)Pr()( tTtF ≤= , which is the likelihood that a merger announcement has occurred by 
time t. The complement of the cdf is known as the “survival function”
∫
∞
=−=>=
t
dxxftFtTtS )()(1)Pr()( , which is the likelihood that a merger partner has 
not been found by time t. In other words, it is the probability that there is no merger 
announcement before t. The hazard function h(t) is the probability that the event takes 
place in a given interval, conditional upon the SPAC having “survived” to the beginning 
of the interval, divided by dt. The hazard function can be defined as 
.}|Pr{lim)(
0 dt
tTdttTtth
dt
>+≤<
=
→  
By taking the limit as the interval dt goes to zero and 
rewriting, we get 
)(
)()(
tS
tfth = . If we know the hazard function, we can calculate f(t) 
with the SPAC data sample of specific announcement times in conjunction with the 
survival function S(t).  
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Having no predisposition towards the functional form for the hazard function, 
we can utilize a model first described by Cox (1972) known as a proportional hazard 
model, )exp()()( '00 ββ jj thth Χ+= . The benefit with this approach is that we make no 
assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time. If we were to mistakenly select a 
particular parameterization of h(t), we might produce dubious results for β . The 
baseline hazard, )(0 th is the hazard subject j faces, modified by the explanatory 
variables )exp( '0 ββ jΧ+ . The model is “proportional”, such that the hazard firm j faces 
is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard. If 0=Χ j then the hazard 
function of the jth SPAC is the baseline hazard function, or the hazard function in the 
absence of covariates.  
Since we know the set of SPAC merger announcement dates ti, we would like to 
find the best estimates of β that maximizes the likelihood of observing the data, given a 
set of covariates jΧ . We offer the following example to demonstrate the likelihood 
function and the use of the Cox proportional model mentioned above.  
SPAC Time 
Independent Variable 
(xj, a single element in vector Xj) 
1 3 4 
2 4 1 
3 6 3 
4 12 2 
 
There are four SPACs that each announces a merger at a specific time, ti. There 
are also four separate probabilities of announcing a merger for each announcing SPAC. 
For example, we can find P1, the probability at time 3 that firm 1 is the one that 
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announces in a dataset with four firms, given that SPACs 2, 3, and 4 do not announce. 
We find the probability (P2) at time 4 that SPAC 2 announces a merger in a dataset that 
contains firms 2, 3, and 4, given that SPACs 3 and 4 do not announce a merger. This 
continues as we find P3 and P4.  
The likelihood function equals 4321)( PPPPL =β , where Pi, i = 1,…,4 is a 
conditional probability for each merger announcement time. At time = 12, given that 
one failure occurs, the probability that it is firm 4 is P4 =1. Up to time 6, there are only 
two firms that have not announced a merger, SPAC 3 and SPAC 4. According to Bayes, 
the conditional probability that the announcement is by firm 3 at time 6 or 
)6at time announces SPAC a |announces 3 SPACPr(3 =P  is
)3not  and 4by  dexperience isevent ()4not  and 3by  dexperience isevent (
4)not  and 3by  dexperience isevent (
3 PP
PP
+
= . 
This can also be written as 
]3)by  dexperiencenot  isevent (4)by  dexperience isevent (
4)by  dexperiencenot  isevent (3)by  dexperience isevent ([
4)by  dexperiencenot  isevent (3)by  dexperience isevent (
3
PP
PP
PPP
⋅
+⋅
⋅
= . 
Recall that ),|( 11 Xtf β is the likelihood of observing an announcement time 
given the value of X1 and can be written as ),|(),|( 1111 XthXtS ββ , due to the 
relationship between the hazard function and the survival function discussed earlier. 
The probability of not announcing past time t1, given X1 is ),|( 11 XtS β . We can rewrite 
P3 as  
),|(),|(),|(),|(
),|(),|(
33444433
4433
XtSXtfXtSXtf
XtSXtf
ββββ
ββ
⋅+⋅
⋅ .  
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Substituting ),|(),|( iiii XthXtS ββ for ),|( ii Xtf β we now can write P3 as
)6()]6()6([)6()]6()6([
)6()]6()6([
344433
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ShSShS
ShS
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⋅ . After cancellations
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3
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According to the Cox model, the hazard of announcing a merger is 
)exp()6()6( 00 ββ jj xhh += at time 6. So for SPAC 3 and SPAC 4 we have  
)3(6)exp(   (6)  6) at time 3 SPAC( 003 ββ +== hhh  and 
)2(6)exp(   (6)  6) at time 4 SPAC( 004 ββ +== hhh . 
Notice that in both of these equations the value of xj is different for each firm’s 
hazard function since x3 is equal to 3 and x4 is equal to 2, i.e., these are variables with 
firm-specific observations that do not vary with time. We can now substitute 
)X)exp(( 'j00 ββ +th for each )(thj listed above in P3. As shown earlier, the probability 
that the announcement is by SPAC 3 at time 6 is 
)6()6(
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and since exp(x + y) = exp(x)exp(y) 
)2exp()exp()6()3exp()exp()6(
)3exp()exp()6(
0000
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3 ββββ
ββ
hh
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Now the baseline hazard function )6(0h and )exp( 0β terms cancel, and we are 
left with 
    )2exp()3exp(
)3exp(
ββ
β
+
=
. 
In like manner,  
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4321)( PPPPL =β can also be written as ∏∑= ∈
=
4
1 )exp(
)exp(
)(
j Ri j
j
j
x
x
L
β
β
β  
where Rj is the set of SPACs at risk of announcing a merger at time tj. Generally this is 
∏∑= ∈
=
k
j Ri j
j
j
X
X
L
1
'
'
)exp(
)exp(
)(
β
β
β where we have k distinct observed announcement times. We 
will use this model to analyze the potential impact of various explanatory variables on 
the expected time to merger announcement for the SPAC firms in our sample. The 
ability of this function to incorporate the pdf of time to merger announcement along 
with the cdf (survival function) makes the use of a hazard model particularly 
appropriate for analysis of the SPAC merger times. We can maximize the likelihood 
function to find the regression coefficients that explain how the economic variables in 
our data set impact the expected time to merger for a SPAC. By using a statistical 
software package, we will be able to find the estimates of β  using Newton-Raphson 
numerical iteration techniques that are standard in the non-linear maximization 
problems associated with survival analysis. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1.Managerial Characteristics 
Managers are essential to the success of any firm, big or small, private or public 
as are SPAC managers. They make all business decisions for SPACs33, 34. In detail, they 
set up SPAC firms, evaluate potential targets, and consummate acquisitions. They are in 
charge during the whole life span of a SPAC. As commanders of the SPACs, we believe 
that the magnitude of lambda is an artifact of a host of characteristics that document the 
impact of management. 
 
5.1.1. Age 
Yim (2013) in his investigation of executive post-acquisition compensation 
finds younger CEOs are more likely to make acquisitions since they expect to receive 
large, permanent increases in compensation earlier in their career. Yim’s (2013) 
“career” hypothesis suggests that younger SPAC managers would work harder to 
develop more potential targets and, consequently, enhance the value of lambda (the rate 
of arrival of potential targets). On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that older SPAC 
managers would have years of experience in private equity as well as mergers and 
acquisitions. These men and women would likely have contacts and connections that far 
33 SPACs usually do not distinguish between managers and directors. The two words are used 
interchangeably and are inclusive of each other. In fact, most SPACs explicitly use “Our current directors 
and executive officers are listed below” to introduce their board of directors on prospectus. The board of 
directors is usually divided into three classes with only one class being elected in each year and each class 
serving a three-year term. The SPACs also identify some of the directors as “independent” directors as 
defined in Rule 10A-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and as defined by the rules of 
the American Stock Exchange.  
34 Some SPACs hire external experts as “advisors”, “senior advisors”, or “special advisors”. Advisors are 
expected to provide knowledge, experience, and general management advise to the SPACs. Some 
advisors are shareholders of the SPACs. These advisors act as external consultants, and they are not on 
the management team.  
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outnumber those of their younger counterparts and lead to a higher lambda. Given the 
contradiction, we believe that the ultimate determination of the effect of age upon the 
time to merger is an empirical matter. Due to the fact that each SPAC has multiple 
managers with varying ages, we use the average age of the managers as a RHS variable 
in our Cox regressions35 
 
5.1.2. Number of SPACs Involved with 
Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) study the role of “busy” directors in IPO 
firms and find that “busy” directors improve firm value by offering valuable experience 
that businesses could not gain from other sources.36 If so, we would expect “busy” 
SPAC managers will enjoy a higher lambda. On the other hand, literature on “busy 
directors” generally supports the view that directors can negatively influence the value 
of a firm when they hold too many directorships at the same time. For example, Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) find that “busy” board members are associated with weak 
governance and poor firm performance37. Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim (2010) document that 
the shareholders react negatively when the directors of an acquiring firm hold too many 
directorships. In our case, instead of shareholders reacting, it could be potential merger 
partners that perceive a manager as being over extended when he or she is involved in 
too many SPAC projects. Targets may feel that over extended SPAC managers have 
neither the time nor the motivation to complete a merger. In this case, lambda would 
35 We also considered using the maximum and minimum executive age as RHS variables, but we 
recognize that the measures may pick up the effects of the outliers and dropped them from consideration. 
36 According to the authors, “busy” directors are independent directors who hold three or more 
directorships.   
37 According to the authors, “busy” board is defined as those in which a majority of independent directors 
hold three or more directorships.  
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fall and the expected time to merger would increase. We use the number of SPACs a 
manager is involved with to capture how “busy” an individual manager is. In our Cox 
regressions, we use the average and the maximum number of SPACs each manager is 
involved with to measure this effect upon the time to merger. 
 
5.1.3. Total Managerial Ownership Percentage 
Previous studies have provided support for the notion that stock ownership by 
management enhances executive effort. For example, Alavi, Pham, and Pham (2008) 
find that managerial ownership before an IPO incentivizes managers to exert more 
effort during the IPO process. The IPO process for a SPAC generally reduces the total 
managerial ownership from around 100% in pre-IPO period to a much lower level 
(about 20% on average) in post-IPO period. When managers expect a high lambda due 
to their pre-IPO efforts, we suspect they would retain a larger share of ownership in the 
post-IPO period. Conversely, managers would retain a lower level of post-IPO 
ownership if they expect a low lambda. In our model, we maintain lambda will be 
greater when the reduction in managerial ownership in the post-IPO period is smaller. 
Consequently, we expect the time to merger to be shortened. The reduction in 
percentage ownership is the difference between the pre- and the post-IPO ownership by 
management. 
 
5.1.4. Ownership Dispersion 
Given that there are between two and eleven members on the managerial team, 
the dispersion of ownership between managers may also influence SPAC effort and, 
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consequently, the rate of arrival of target firms (lambda). For example, if there are 4 
managers, and one owns 17% of the firm (the “majority owner”), while the other three 
own 1%, this would be considered concentrated ownership.  If those same four 
managers own 5% each, this is considered dispersed ownership. In order for lambda to 
be larger for the firm with dispersed ownership, the increase in target development of 
the three managers that go from 1% to 5% ownership must be greater than the decrease 
in development activity of the majority owner when his ownership falls to 5%38. We 
expect lambda to increase as the ownership becomes more dispersed, hence the 
expected time to merger would be shortened. In support of our disposition, Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) document that in small firms where managerial ownership 
is concentrated, board size negatively impacts profitability. This implies that 
concentrated ownership could be value-destroying for small firms such as SPACs. We 
use the difference in percentage ownership of the manager holding the greatest share of 
the SPAC (post IPO) and the combined ownership of all other managers (own_diff) 39 as 
an independent variable. In addition, we employ a Herfindahl index to capture this 
ownership dispersion effect upon manager effort40. 
 
38 Although the SPAC posits in its prospectus that it has not targeted a specific firm or business to merge 
with, management states that they have advised a number of their contacts that a pool of capital is being 
raised for acquisitions and that they intend to seek a business partner after the consummation of the IPO.  
As managers advise their contacts, they indirectly augment the pool of potential partners, which in turn 
increases λ.  The number of contacts made depends on the number of managers and the extent of their 
commitment.  Both of these characteristics of the SPAC managers are artifacts of their ownership share. 
39 Own_diff is defined as the difference in percentage ownership between the first listed manager and the 
rest of the managers combined. Algebraically, own_diff = own_1st – (own_total – own_1st) = 2*own_1st – 
own_total.  
40 The Herfindahl index is calculated as 1 minus the sum of squared individual percentage ownership. For 
example, if a SPAC has 4 managers and each manager owns 25% of pre-IPO SPAC shares, the 
Herfindahl index is calculated as 1 – 4*(0.25)2 = 0.75. If three managers own 10% of the SPAC shares 
each and one manager owns 70% of the SPAC shares, the Herfindahl index becomes 1 – 3*(0.10)2 – 
(0.70)2 = 0.48. The Herfinhal index is decreasing as the ownership becomes concentrated.  
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5.1.5. Managerial Ownership at the IPO Stage 
All firms seeking an IPO, including SPACs, must file a Statement of 
Registration (Form S-1) with the SEC. It is common for there to be several amendments 
to this form prior to the final Form S-1 being filed. We believe that the number of Form 
S-1 filings and the time from the initial to the final filing could help document the 
managerial effort at the IPO stage. These two activities could also signal SPAC 
management effort to find a post-IPO merger partner. Lowry and Schwert (2002) find 
that the market learns important information about management during the registration 
period and that this information has implications for the IPO volume and the initial 
stock returns. In our case, the potential merger targets could track SPAC management 
efforts during the registration process and then react to that information. For example, 
potential targets may be encouraged by the S-1 filing efforts of SPAC managers. 
Elevated interest by targets would increase lambda and reduce the E(TM). We proxy 
these efforts by SPAC managers with two variables: the number of days a SPAC takes 
to file all S-1forms and the total number of S-1 forms a SPAC files. We use both 
variables in our investigation of the determinants of the time to SPAC mergers.  
 
5.1.6. Working Hours 
85 SPACs in our sample explicitly state the number of weekly working hours 
their executives are expected to spend on the SPAC related issues. For instance, Shine 
Media Acquisition Corp. mentions the following in its prospectus, “we expect each of 
[our managers] to devote a minimum of approximately ten hours per week to our 
business during the target identification stage, and close to fulltime during negotiations 
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of a business combination”. We believe the number of hours is a direct measure of 
managerial effort, and we expect it to decrease the expected time to merger. 
 
5.1.7. CEO Education 
We believe education background could signal a manager’s ability and financial 
literacy. In their study on acquisition decisions, Malmendier and Tate (2008, JFE) use 
CEO educational background as one dimension of executive characteristics. Following 
their measure, we create two dummy variables. One dummy variable documents if a 
CEO earned an MBA degree, as we believe an MBA degree not only provides a CEO 
with the relevant financial knowledge but also signals the ability the CEO possesses. 
The other dummy variable documents if a CEO earned a degree at master’s level or 
higher (excluding MBAs).  
 
5.1.8. Managerial Reputation 
We use Factiva scores as a proxy for the level of awareness that the public has 
of SPAC executives. The Factiva score that we use as a RHS variable measures the 
number of news articles that contain each of the SPAC managers’ names. The news 
sources include newspapers, official government publications, publications by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), company newswires and press release wires, 
official and unofficial company blogs, etc. Malmendier and Tate (2008) use Factiva 
scores as a measure of CEO overconfidence and conclude that arrogant CEOs make 
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value-destroying mergers and acquisitions41. We believe that a higher Factiva score 
means greater media attention, which has the potential of gaining attention of possible 
merger targets. In other words, the more often a SPAC manager’s name appears in the 
financial media, the greater the chance that potential targets would perceive the 
individual favorably. Consequently, we expect potential merger targets may emerge 
more rapidly for SPACs with highly recognized managers.  Higher Factiva scores will 
improve lambda (the rate of arrival of targets) and shorten the time to merger. 42 
Though Malmendier and Tate (2008) as well as Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) 
exclusively focus on CEOs, we collected the number of news reports for each of the top 
five managers43 of each SPAC because we believe any of the SPAC manager could 
draw the attention of potential targets. We collected the number of news reports during 
a one-year period prior to the prospectus filing date. We do so to measure the 
established managerial reputation prior to the SPAC’s existence44. We then average 
across the five managers to get the average number of news reports for each SPAC’s 
top five managers. We call this computation the average Factiva score, which we use as 
a quantitative measurement of managerial reputation.  
 
5.1.9. Empirical Results 
41 Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) use CEOs’ exposure in the financial press (a similar measure to 
Factiva scores) to capture their external employment opportunities as the authors believe that the CEO 
talent is scarce in labor market. 
42 In the cases where an executive is listed with a middle initial, the search was performed both with and 
without the middle initial and the results were combined to obtain the variable value.   
43 We use the rankings on the SPAC prospectus to determine the top five managers.  
44 The cited papers use panel Factiva scores. In other words, the Factiva scores in those papers have time 
variations. However, the data we use are purely cross-sectional, hence our measure is not totally 
comparable to theirs.  
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Descriptive statistics of SPAC managerial characteristics are reported in Table 
2-1. SPAC managers are in general very young with average age of 28. In a study of 
CEOs in S&P 1500 firms, Yim (2013) reports the average age of CEOs is 55.2 years 
old. Although the difference in the average age is large, it is also clear that managing an 
S&P 1500 firm requires a different skill set than managing a SPAC firm.  The majority 
of SPAC managers are involved in only a single SPAC project, however, it is possible 
to document managers involved in as many as 5 SPAC projects45. In a study of “busy 
directors”, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report on average each outside director in a 
Fortune 500 company holds 3.11 directorships. The combined holdings of all other 
managers exceed the SPAC ownership of the 1st listed manager by 10%. The ownership 
Herfindahl index is 0.795 which indicates a thoroughly dispersed ownership. It takes 
just over 5 months for a SPAC to complete its S-1 filings. During the process, the 
average SPAC would file the S-1 and the amended S-1 forms 6 times. We found 
interestingly that the first listed manager on a SPAC has a much higher Factiva score 
than the rest of the managers (226 for 1st listed managers versus 125 for all managers46). 
[Insert Table 2-1 about here] 
We initially run the Cox regressions with just one of the independent variables 
discussed above, we then successively replace each RHS variable with another for each 
new regression. At the end of this process, if we have more than one variable that is 
statistically significant, we combine them, and run a multivariate Cox regression. The 
45 At this stage, we are unable to identify if the SPAC projects they involved in are 
simultaneous or sequential. 
46 The 1st listed manager typically is the largest owner, but this is not always the case.  
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results of the Cox regressions for the managerial characteristics as determinants of the 
time to merger are reported in Table 2-2. 
[Insert Table 2-2 about here] 
We first focus on the variables that measure managerial experience. The average 
age of SPAC managers is a statistically significant variable in the determination of the 
time to merger. Clearly the coefficients reported above are not directly very intuitive. 
However, for a quantitative variable like “age_avg”, we can use the transformation 
100*(e-0.0172616 – 1) which gives us the percentage change in the expected time to 
merger for a single unit increase in average age of the SPAC managers. Thus, we have 
100*(0.9828865279 - 1) = -1.71134721%. According to our model, then, an increase in 
the average age of our SPAC managers reduces the expected time to merger by 
1.71134721%47. The older the average age of the SPAC managers, the shorter the time 
to a merger. Our results contrast with prior literature which documents younger CEOs 
outperforming older ones. The 1.711% reduction in the dependent variable documents 
the superior reservoir of contacts and connections that accrue to older SPAC managers 
with experience in the business of mergers and acquisitions. The other two measures of 
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managerial experience, the average and the maximum number of SPACs a manager is 
involved with are not statistically significant. 
We then investigate the impact of managerial incentives in the determination of 
the SPAC’s time to merger. Unfortunately, none of these three measures (i.e. total 
ownership, difference in ownership, and the Herfindahl index on ownership) provide 
significant estimates. In a similar fashion, we find the measurements of managerial 
effort, including the number of days filing S-1 and the total S-1 filings, are statistically 
insignificant in explaining the time to merger. Finally, the effects of managerial 
reputation, as measured by the average and the first listed manager’s Factiva scores, do 
not have a statistically significant impact upon the time to merger. In conclusion, we 
found that the only significant RHS variable is the average age of SPAC managers. An 
increase in the average age of SPAC management reduces the time to merger.  
 
5.2.Investor Characteristics 
SPAC investors have a stake in the successful merger of their firm. In fact, 
Lewellen (2009) reports that the monthly buy-and-hold excess returns to shareholders 
are around 2.40% for SPACs that have announced a target. Therefore, investors have an 
incentive to monitor the effort of SPAC managers in regard to achieving a successful 
merger. Consequently, we believe that various investor characteristics and their 
associated behavior could affect the magnitude of lambda.  
 
5.2.1. Number of Large Investors per SPAC 
101 
Large investors, especially institutional investors are key monitors of 
corporations. They monitor the behavior of management through several channels. For 
example, Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) argue that institutional investors have 
greater access to management hence they use private negotiations to monitor firms. 
Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo (2010) provide evidence that securities litigation48 is 
another effective monitoring tool for institutional investors. We suspect monitoring 
forces SPAC managers to exert a higher level of effort in the development of potential 
targets. We expect the greater the number of institutional investors in a given SPAC, the 
larger the rate of arrival of potential merger targets (lambda) and the shorter the time to 
merger. Empirically, we hand collected number of investors who file 13G and 13D 
Schedules with the SEC to document their purchase and sell offs of the SPAC units at 
hand and we used that as a measurement of the number of large investors. (A detailed 
discussion on 13G and 13D filings is presented in section 5.2.3.) 
 
5.2.2. Number of SPACs Each Large Investor Involved With 
If a large investor is involved in multiple SPACs, they could gain experience in 
dealing with SPACs and become more effective in monitoring the performance of the 
SPACs’ managers. Alternatively, there might be a dilution in the time to monitor as the 
number of SPACs involved with increases, which makes the large investors less 
effective monitors49. Consequently, we let the resolution of the effect of multiple SPAC 
holdings to be an empirical matter. The total number and the average number of SPACs 
48 In detail, the paper investigates the impact of using securities class action lawsuits on monitoring 
defendant firms. The plaintiffs are shareholders of the defendant firm and are usually lead by an investor 
with the largest stake (usually an institution).   
49 At present, we do not know whether the large investors involve with SPACs sequentially (good 
monitors) or simultaneously (poor monitors). 
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held by institutional investors were used in our Cox regressions. The measurements are 
constructed as follows. First, we collect investor names for each SPAC from 13D and 
13G filings. Subsequently, we count the number of SPACs each investor is involved 
with. To be counted as an “involvement” with a SPAC, the investor has to file at least 
one 13D or 13G forms for the SPAC. Finally, we calculate the average and the total 
number of SPAC involvement across all investors for each SPAC.  
 
5.2.3. Number of Schedule 13G or 13D Filings 
Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) study blockholder governance and point out that 
blockholders who intend to engage in intervention must file a 13D, while those who 
intend to remain passive have the option of filing a 13G instead. In other words, 13D 
and 13G could be proxies for active and passive investors, respectively50. Klein and Zur 
(2009) document the similarities and differences among different types of investors who 
file 13D. They find that all filers enjoy positive returns around the initial 13D filings. In 
addition, large shareholders, even passive ones, could impact SPAC manager 
performance. If blockholders are more effective monitors, the lambda should increase 
as the number of large investors increase. On the other hand, the 13D and 13G forms 
filed by investors may just reflect their sell offs. In particular, investors may sell their 
SPAC shares when they perceive that a merger is unlikely to occur. If this is true, the 
number of both 13D and 13G forms should be negatively associated with lambda. 
Given the contradictory predictions, we have decided to treat the impact of the number 
of 13D/G filings upon the time to merger as an empirical matter. We use the total 
50 Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) also find that a 13G filing is following by positive market reaction, a 
positive holding period return, and an improvement in firm performance. 
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number of all 13D/G filings and the number of each type of filings to capture the effect 
of effective monitors. 
 
5.2.4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics of investor characteristics are reported in Table 2-3. An 
average SPAC has 11.11 blockholders who file 13D or 13G forms to SEC. On average, 
the blockholders file 10.22 13G forms, 12.68 13G amended forms, 1.79 13D forms, and 
2.40 13D amended forms for each SPAC. The average blockholder is involved with 32 
SPACs.  
[Insert Table 2-3 about here] 
Identical to our procedure in the previous sections, we first run Cox regressions 
with each one of the independent variables discussed above, we then replace that variate 
with each new regression. At the end of the process, if there is more than one significant 
variable, we combine them on the right hand side, and run a multivariate Cox 
regression. The results of the bivariate Cox regressions with investor characteristics as 
determinants of the time to merger are reported in Table 2-4.  
We first estimate the impact of the number of blockholders per SPAC upon the 
time to merger. The number of SPAC owners who file a 13D or 13G form is a 
significant RHS variable. According to our model, one more 13D/G filer is associated 
with 100*(1.0510 - 1) = 5.10% increase in the expected time to merger. This result is 
contrary to what we anticipated but it could be that most of our documented filings are 
sell-offs. Investors decide that the SPAC’s lambda is lower than they originally thought 
and they sell off. In fact, Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) suggest that passive 
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shareholders intervene only through exiting (selling the shares). Our descriptive 
statistics show that the number of passive blockholders (13G filers) exceeds that of 
active blockholders (13D filers). Hence our unexpected results may be mainly driven by 
the inactive monitoring provided by passive shareholders.  
We then investigate the impact of large investors’ involvement in SPACs upon 
the expected time to merger. Empirically, we use two measurements to capture the 
effect: the total and the average number of SPACs that the 13D/G filer at hand is 
involved with. We find that only the second of the two RHS variables is statistically 
significant and its impact is intuitive. In particular, as the average number of SPAC 
involved with increases by 1, the expected time to merger is reduced by 2.77% (that is 
100*(0.9723 – 1)). This result supports the notion that large investors become more 
effective monitors as they become involved with more SPACs.  
Next we estimate the impact of the number of 13D and 13G filings for each 
SPAC. We break down the effect into four measurements: the total number of 13D, 
13D/A, 13G, and 13G/A filings, respectively. The forms 13D/A and 13G/A are the 
amended version of forms 13D and 13G. Except for the number of 13G/A filings, we 
find strong positive results for all other variates at 1% significance level. In detail, we 
find an additional 13G, 13D, and 13D/A filing is associated with an increase in the 
expected time to merger by 3.86%, 11.42%, and 7.00%, respectively. The results 
contradict our ‘a priori’ notion that the filings would increase the rate of arrival of 
potential targets (lambda) and reduce the time to merger. Again, we argue that the 
increase in the independent variable at hand is associated with sell offs. The 13D and 
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13G filings document sell offs as well as purchases. That is, it is possible that investors 
have made downward revisions in their assessment of lambda. 
[Insert Table 2-4 about here] 
We now run Cox regressions with multiple independent variables that capture 
the investor characteristics. We do so by collecting and combining the variables that 
produce significant results in the bivariate Cox regressions. The results of the two steps 
are reported in Table 2-5.  
When we combine the 5 significant variables from the bivariate regressions, we 
find that only two measures remain significant. The average number of SPACs that a 
13D/G filer is involved with continue to produce hazard ratios below one. In particular, 
an additional SPAC that a 13D/G filer is involved with reduces the expected time to 
merger by 1.98% (that is 100*(0.9802 -1)). Moreover, the total number of 13D/A filings 
continue to increase the expected time to merger by 5.40% (that is 100*(1.0540 – 1)). 
The remaining RHS variables become insignificant in this setting. 
[Insert Table 2-5 about here] 
In summary, from the bivariate analyses we find at least one RHS variable under 
each of the three categories of investor characteristics is statistically significant in the 
determination of the expected time to merger. In the multivariate Cox regression, two 
measures (the average number of SPACs that a 13D/G filer is involved with and the 
total number of 13D/A filings) continue to provide a statistically meaningful 
explanation of the expected time to merger.  
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5.3.Macroeconomic Conditions 
We argue that a surge in aggregate demand usually accounts for an increase in 
GDP or GDP growth. To accommodate this increase in demand, often firms are forced 
to increase their capacity. For private firms, obtaining funds can be difficult in either 
debt or equity markets (IPO). Consequently, more private firms may use SPACs as an 
alternative funding source. If this is true, we expect the arrival rate of potential targets 
(lambda) to be greater when the economy heats up. 
 
5.3.1. Real GDP and Real GDP Growth 
Real GDP is the price adjusted total of final goods and services produced in the 
US economy in a year’s time. We use real GDP and its percentage change as RHS in 
the determination of the SPAC’s time to merger51.  
 
5.3.2. Empirical Results  
The conventional Cox model is only capable of handling cross-sectional 
variations rather than variations within a SPAC unit over time. Our macroeconomic 
conditions variables, however, are time varying hence cannot be estimated with 
conventional Cox regressions. Following prior literature in statistics,52 we modify the 
conventional Cox model to allow for time varying variables. Specifically, we enter the 
SPAC observations as follows. We first enter each SPAC into multiple rows, where the 
number of rows is equal to the number of quarters during which the SPAC has available 
51 Jeng and Wells (2000) use real GDP to proxy for the activity level of venture capitalists. Lowry (2003) 
real GDP growth as a proxy of private firms’ capital demands in a study of IPO activities. Lowry(2003) 
points out that the capital demands of private targets are high when the overall economy grows quickly. 
52 For example, Martinussen and Scheike (2006). 
107 
                                                 
data. For each row of entry, we keep the time invariant variables the same and update 
the time varying variables from one quarter to the next. The procedure allows us to 
estimate the impact of time varying variables with Cox regressions.  
We then run bivariate and, if necessary, a multivariate Cox regressions as we 
have done in previous sections. The regression results are reported in Table 2-6.  
[Insert Table 2-6 about here] 
When we include GDP growth as a single RHS variable in a Cox regression, we 
find it increases the expected time to merger. Specifically, we find that one percentage 
point increase in the GDP growth rate is associated with 7.71% (that is, (1.077177 – 
1)*100% = 7.7177%) increase in the time to merger. A increase in the level of GDP by 
one trillion dollars increases the expected time to merger by 69.11% (that is (1.691166 – 
1)*100%). Both results are contradictory to our predictions.  
Since both the growth rate and the level of GDP produce significant estimates in 
the bivariate regressions, we include both in a multivariate Cox regression. The growth 
rate of GDP remains statistically significant. Results show that a one percentage point 
increase in GDP growth is associated with 7.03% (that is (1.07329 – 1)*100%) increase 
in the expected time to merger. In this context, the level of GDP becomes statistically 
insignificant in the determination of the time to merger.  
The unexpected signs on our two MC variables points to the fact that running 
Cox regression solely on real macroeconomic variables is myopic. All three equations 
are probably misspecified. That is, we may have excluded some meaningful 
intermediate variables. For instance, if real GDP and real GDP growth have both 
increased (putting pressure on firm capacity) then it is possible that IPOs have increased 
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which “crowds out” SPACs as a way to finance desired capital expenditures by private 
firms. Or perhaps the surge in aggregate economic activity is an artifact of expansionary 
open market operations by the Fed. With expanded bank reserves, capital expansion by 
private firms can be accomplished by borrowing from banks, eliminating the need for 
SPAC as an investment vehicle. By omitting these variables from our empirical 
analysis, our Cox regressions have produced counterfeit results.  
 
5.4.Underwriter Characteristics 
5.4.1. Lead Underwriter, the Number of Underwriters, and IPO Allocation  
When preparing for IPO, a SPAC usually hires a group of underwriters. Among 
them, one serves as the representative (lead) underwriter. We record the names of the 
representative underwriters and count their appearances. We then create a dummy 
variable for those which serve as the lead underwriter for at least 20 SPACs. As a result, 
we identify two underwriters that satisfy the criteria, namely Citigroup Global Markets 
and EarlyBird Capital. We use these two dummy variables to investigate if the 
representative underwriter has any effect on the expected time to merger. 
We also believe that the number of underwriters per SPAC speaks to the view 
the market has for the SPAC in terms of riskiness.  Having fewer underwriters means 
that each underwriter is willing to shoulder a larger portion of the risk associated with 
the SPAC. We hypothesize that an underwriter is willing to accept large share allocation 
in IPO only when the underwriter believes that the SPAC is likely to complete a merger 
successfully. When an underwriter finds the IPO of a SPAC too risky, the underwriter 
seeks to share the risk with other underwriters. Empirically, we use two variables to 
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capture this effect: the total number of underwriters per SPAC and the percentage of 
shares allocated to the first listed underwriter. We expect lambda to decrease as the 
number of underwriters increases (or as the percentage of allocation to the first listed 
underwriter decreases).  
 
5.4.2. Underwriter Experience  
The number of SPACs each underwriter is involved with speaks to the overall 
experience of the underwriter with regard to SPACs.  Underwriters who are involved 
with multiple SPACs may be uniquely placed to offer assistance beyond simply 
providing the shares in the IPO53. Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that the 
certification role provided by venture capitalists helps to reduce the total costs of going 
public through IPOs. Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) find that the venture 
capitalist’s experience in VC backed IPOs is positively associated with the long-run 
performance of the public firms. We argue that the underwriters’ previous experience 
with SPAC IPOs should enhance the likelihood of SPACs completing a merger. Our 
empirical measurement of underwriter experience includes the average number of 
SPAC IPOs that each underwriter is involved with and that the first underwriter is 
involved with. We expect the more experience the underwriters have, the larger the 
lambda and the shorter the expected time to a merger.  
 
5.4.3. Purchase Options  
53 Most underwriters provide “firm commitment” to an IPO. Specifically, the underwriter (or the 
syndicated underwriters) will purchase all new issuing shares from the offering firm at a discount. The 
underwriter(s) then will sell the shares to the public. The underwriter(s) will bear the risk of not being 
able to sell all the shares since the offering firm has already been paid then the shares are bought by the 
underwriter(s).  
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The purchase option is an option to purchase stock granted to the underwriter(s) 
as part of their compensation.  This is separate from the overallotment amount which is 
explained in the next subsection. We argue underwriters ask for more options if they 
believe both the value of lambda and the likelihood of a SPAC merger is high. 
Empirically, we measure the purchase options in millions of shares. 
 
5.4.4. Overallotment  
We compare (A) the number of issues the SPAC intends to offer from the 
prospectus and (B) the number of shares outstanding from the first Form 8-K filing.  If 
(A) is less than (B), the difference is the overallotment used. The amount of the 
overallotment used indicates the level of enthusiasm the market has for the IPO. If more 
of the overallotment is used, then the SPAC is facing a more enthusiastic market and 
management should have an easier time finding a suitable acquisition target. We 
hypothesize that the lambda is larger when the overallotment is high. Empirically, we 
measure the overallotment for each SPAC in millions of shares. 
 
5.4.5. Offer Discount 
Empirically we measure offer discount as the difference between the IPO price 
and the first recorded closing price, scaled by the IPO price. We argue that SPAC with 
high perceived value of lambda would experience larger price increase in the first few 
days of trading. So we expect lambda to be bigger when the offer discount variable is 
more negative. 
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5.4.6. Underwriter Compensation 
Thompson (2010) reports that on average underwriters receive about 7% of 
proceeds as compensation at offering. He further reports that some underwriters choose 
to defer part of the compensation until the successful consummation of the initial 
merger. The more compensation an underwriter receives upfront, the less proceeds will 
be deposited into the trust. Therefore, we expect an increase in underwriter 
compensation will increase the expected time to merger. On the other hand, when an 
underwriter chooses to defer its compensation until the initial merger completes, the 
shareholders are better protected because they will be entitled to receive the deferred 
underwriter compensation in case the SPAC fails to finish a merger. Thus the expected 
time to merger should fall in the case of deferred compensation. Empirically, we 
measure the underwriter compensation as a percentage of total proceeds. We use a 
dummy variable to document if the compensation is deferred. 
 
5.4.7. Empirical Results  
Descriptive statistics of underwriter characteristics are presented in Table 2-7. 
Each SPAC uses 3.45 underwriters to help with their IPO issuance. The first listed 
underwriter receives about 66% of all IPO shares. On average, each underwriter has 
dealt with SPAC IPO issuance for 36 times, while the first listed underwriter has 
involved with 28 SPAC IPO issuances. The offer discount, measured as the percentage 
difference between the IPO price and the first recorded closing price, is around 8%. 
[Insert Table 2-7 about here] 
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Following our procedures laid out in previous sections, we first run Cox 
regressions with each one of the independent variables discussed above, we then replace 
that variate in each new regression. At the end of the process, if there is more than one 
significant variable, we combine them on the right hand side, and run a multivariate 
Cox regression. The results of the bivariate Cox regressions with underwriter 
characteristics as determinants of the time to merger are reported in Table 2-8. 
The Cox regressions suggest that underwriter’s options and overallotment are 
significant in the determination of the SPACs’ time to merger. Specifically, every 
1,000,000 shares increase in underwriter options is associated with 47.01% ( = 
100*[1.4701 – 1]) increase in the time to merger, and every 1,000,000 shares increase in 
overallotment is associated with 0.0001% ( = 100*[0.9999 – 1]) decrease in the 
expected time to merger. The latter result supports our view that the overallotment 
speaks to the market’s enthusiasm about a SPAC’s merger prospects. The former result 
is contradictory to our hypothesis which states that the higher the options, the lower the 
expected time to merger. We attribute the reason to be that underwriters attempt to 
“fool” the market about a SPAC’s quality by increasing the number of its options. We 
also find that when SPACs use Citigroup Global Markets as the representative 
underwriter, their expected time to merger decreases by 43.67% [100*(1-0.5633)]. Last 
but not least, the results on underwriter compensation are consistent with our 
predictions. Specifically, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in underwriter 
compensation (relative to total proceeds) is associated with a 13.51% [100%*(1.1351 – 
1)] increase in expected time to merger. In addition, when an underwriter chooses to 
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defer part of the compensation until the completion of the initial merger, the expected 
time to merger falls by 29.25% [100%*(1-0.7075)].  
[Insert Table 2-8 about here] 
Since underwriter options and overallotment, a dummy variable for Citigroup, 
and two underwriter compensation variables produce significant estimates in the 
bivariate case, we include them in a multivariate Cox regression. The results are 
reported in Table 2-9. We find only two variables remain statistically significant. In 
particular, both the compensation to underwriters as a percentage of total proceeds and 
the number of underwriter options increase the expected time to merger. 
[Insert Table 2-9 about here] 
 
5.5.Financial Conditions 
5.5.1. Interest Rates 
Without publicly traded equity, private firms often use bank loans as a primary 
financing source. As the interest rate goes up, firms face higher borrowing costs and, 
consequently, may consider a SPAC merger to get access to public equity market. In 
addition, periods with high interest rates often witness high systematic risks which 
discourage banks, especially small ones, from lending to private firms due to their 
opaque financial conditions. On the other hand, at depressed rates of interest, SPACs 
are able to acquire more debt, at low cost, and become more attractive to cash hungry 
private firms. Given this contradiction, the impact of interest rates on the expected time 
to merger is an empirical issue. We use the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
and the domestic prime rate to document fluctuations in interest rates. The interest rate 
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data are collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) on a 
monthly basis.  
 
5.5.2. State of IPO Markets 
Although there are distinct differences between SPAC mergers and mergers in 
general, they have enough in common to believe that they could go through similar 
patterns of behavior. If SPACs and mergers have similar cyclical characteristics, then 
the relation that SPACs have with IPOs, a priori, may be compared to the relationship 
that mergers have with IPOs. For example, Rau and Stouraitis (2011 JFQA) find that 
IPO waves typically start first, then merger waves begin shortly thereafter and continue 
after the end of the IPO wave. In another example of the link between mergers and 
IPOs, Brau and Fawcett (JF, 2006), using the results of a survey of 336 CFOs, argue 
that firms decide to go public in order to facilitate future takeover transactions. On the 
basis of these citations, and if SPACs have the same relationship with IPOs as mergers 
do, then a sluggish IPO market means a sluggish SPAC merger (lambda is down) and a 
surge in an IPO market means a surge in the SPAC market (lambda is up).  
If the IPO market is stagnant, then more private firms may choose to go public 
via a SPAC and lambda will rise. Of course this assumes that SPAC reverse mergers 
and IPOs are substitutes as Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins III (JCF 2005) maintain. 
Furthermore, casual empiricism indicates that the SPAC market began to grow in 2002 
as the IPO market reached its nadir; this suggests that IPOs and SPAC-based reverse 
mergers are indeed substitutes. In summary, the discussion here generates conflicting 
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predispositions, consequently the resolution of the impact of IPO success upon the 
magnitude of lambda, and indirectly, the time to a SPAC merger is an empirical matter.  
 
5.5.3. Empirical Results 
The RHS entries for our Cox regressions include the number of gross IPOs and 
the number of net IPOs to capture the IPO market activity. The quarterly number of IPO 
issues is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. Based on Jay Ritter’s definition, gross IPOs 
include the issuance of penny stocks, units, and close-end funds, which are excluded by 
net IPO counts. The results are reported in the tables below. 
[Insert Table 2-10 about here] 
When we use each variate as a single RHS variable in our Cox regressions, all of 
the results produce statistically significant estimates. Specifically, the LIBOR and the 
prime rates significantly increase the expected time to merger by 23.5% and 25.2% 
respectively, which suggests that SPACs facing higher borrowing costs find it difficult 
to attract cash hungry target firms. The number of IPOs also lengthens the expected 
time to merger, although the increase of 1% in expected time to merger represents a 
much smaller impact. This result supports the view that SPACs and IPOs are indeed 
substitutes. 
[Insert Table 2-11 about here] 
When we combine all four variables on the RHS of a multivariate Cox 
regression, the prime rate is the only variable that remains statistically significant. The 
multivariate results suggest that a one percent increase in the prime rate could 
approximately double (100.69% = (2.0069 – 1)*100%) the expected time to merger. 
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The multivariate results again suggest that higher borrowing costs make SPACs less 
attractive to private firms.  
 
5.6.First Mover as A Right-Hand-Side Variable 
If a SPAC is the first firm (a “first mover”) in a target industry to attempt to find 
a partner, then the rate of arrival of potential merger partners λ could be higher than that 
of SPACs that are faced with competing SPACs in their target industry 54. Harford 
(2005) describes the first-mover advantage in corporate mergers from the buyer’s 
perspective and finds that the earliest participants in a sector find the best-performing 
targets.  The stock returns are higher for these earliest participants. Other buyers, with 
late entry into those sectors, suffer from lower (or even negative) stock returns from 
merger and acquisition activities.55 Tufano (2003), in a discussion of financial 
innovation, predicts that first-movers in new securities should generate excess profits 
until competition (other investors) arrives to the marketplace. In a similar setting, 
Herrera and Schroth (2011) study the underwriting fees charged by investment banks 
who enter the market at different stages. The innovating banks (or first movers) who 
develop new corporate securities possess “superior expertise” that allows them to 
recoup the R&D costs even without patent protection. Other investment banks, though 
equally competitive, set lower fees than innovating banks mainly because they are 
considered as “imitators” and hence are not thought to possess “superior skills”. 
54 It is fair to presume that the first SPAC to arrive in an industry will have no competition from other 
SPACs for at least part of the time during its search process. 
55 Herding is when investors mimic other successful market participants; also known as “jumping on the 
bandwagon.”  Influential papers on herding include Wermers (1999), Graham (1999), and Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (1995). 
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On the other hand, “first mover” SPACs may be thought to be exotic in the 
sense that they bring some uniqueness to the marketplace that cannot be easily 
deciphered by market participants. In particular, potential targets may not be familiar 
with the newly innovated SPACs. Their lack of knowledge about SPACs may actually 
discourage their arrival of as a potential partner and precipitate a fall inλ .  
Empirically, we consider two kinds of first movers. First, we pool all SPACs 
together and sort them based on the SPAC IPO date. We then define first movers as the 
SPACs that went public earliest in time. To make the measure more robust, we use 
three different numerical cutoffs. In particular we, alternatively, create a dummy 
variable for a SPAC if it belongs to the first 10%, or 25%, or 50% to be partnered 
during the legal existence of SPACs. Second, we also consider industry-based first 
movers. Specifically, we categorize our SPACs into four groups: China-oriented, 
Western-oriented, single-industry-oriented, and multiple-industry-oriented. Within each 
of the four categories, we defined group-based first movers as the first 10%, 25%, and 
50% SPACs that ever exist in each group. Our Cox regression results are reported in 
Table 2-12.  
[Insert Table 2-12 about here] 
The empirical results suggest that the expected time to merger of the pooled first 
movers is longer than others. For example, the first 50% of SPACs take significantly 
longer time (58%, or (1.58 – 1)*100%) to complete a merger. If we look into grouped 
SPACs, we find that being a first mover is to the detriment to the expected time to 
merger for SPACs whose targets are in a single industry. The expected time to merger 
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for the first 50% of SPACs with single-industry targets is 69% (or (1.69-1)*100%) 
longer. 
The results seem to suggest that the first movers in SPACs did not carry 
advantages and, in fact, being a first mover could be a disadvantage. One possible 
explanation is that potential targets are suspicious of the financial and managerial 
configuration of these Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations. The private merger 
targets may need more time to understand these abstruse corporate innovations and, as a 
consequence, the λ available to first mover SPACs actually falls. 
 
5.7.SPAC Characteristics 
Although SPACs may look similar as a particular kind of public firm, there are 
distinguishing aspects between them. In this section, we investigate how different 
SPAC characteristics influence the expected time to merger. In particular, we analyze 
the impact of the following factors, namely, debt level, time to expiration, the SPAC’s 
stock exchange listing, the number of SPAC offering units, the number of managers, 
warrant characteristics, SPAC IPO proceeds, the waiting period before common shares 
and warrants are traded separately, the number of series of common shares, and the 
characteristics of the SPAC’s auditors.  
 
5.7.1. SPAC Debt Level 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003 JFE) point out, receiving a bank loan 
“certifies” the trustworthiness of an acquirer to the capital market, which may aid in 
their ability to find a suitable target. We believe the “certification effect” extends to 
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SPACs as well – having debt in capital structure signals the trustworthiness of a SPAC 
and hence makes it more attractive to private targets. However, having too much debt 
would not be an enhancement of the SPAC’s financial profile. Private firms could 
consider excessive fixed claims held against the SPAC a burden to a new firm created 
by a merger. Ultimately, we believe that the effect of a SPAC’s debt level on its 
expected time to merger is an empirical issue. We use both the total and net debt level 
of SPACs provided by Capital IQ on a quarterly basis. These two variables are often 
time varying over the life of a SPAC.  
 
5.7.2. SPAC’s Time to Expiration  
SPACs have a set amount of time in which to complete an acquisition before 
they are required to liquidate themselves and return the IPO funds that have not been 
spent on the SPAC’s operating expenses. This time to expiration ranges from 12 to over 
24 months. We believe that the managers of SPACs with a shorter time to maturity will 
be more active in searching for targets that is have a larger lambda than those with 
longer expiry. We use dummy variables to represent the following epochs: 12-18 
months, 18-24 months and over 24 months. The acquirers’ time to termination 
information is hand collected from each SPAC’s prospectus.  
 
5.7.3. Listed Stock Exchanges  
When preparing for an IPO, SPACs can choose to be listed on AMEX, 
NASDAQ, NYSE, or OTC. We believe each exchange provides SPACs with different 
levels of liquidity and investor attention, which may impact their ability to find a 
120 
suitable acquisition target. For instance, Anderson and Dyl (2008 FM) study the SEC 
Rule 144 which regulates the sale of restricted stocks. They find that firms choose 
NASDAQ as opposed to NYSE to reduce the effect of limits on selling restricted 
stocks. Furthermore, Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003, JFE) find that the economic costs 
of such liquidity restrictions to the firm can be sizeable. Finally, Kadlec and McConnell 
(1994 JF) find that firms earn 5% in abnormal return in response to the announcement 
of listing in NYSE. The exchange chosen by each SPAC for its “listing” was hand 
collected from the SPAC’s prospectus. Dummy variables were used to represent the 
selection with AMEX serving as the base group.  
 
5.7.4. Number of Units in Offering  
The vast majority of SPACs issue their shares at a price that does not vary much 
from $7 per unit. Therefore, the number of units offered in the IPO is related to the total 
proceeds the SPAC is able to raise during the offering56. We believe there are two 
reasons that the number of units offered leads to bigger lambda and shorter expected 
time to merger. First, given that a SPAC is required to spend a specified amount of their 
initial proceeds on a single acquisition, typically 80%, the number of units may 
significantly impact their ability to find a suitable acquisition target. More specifically, 
given the 80% constraint, if there are more large private firms seeking public partners, 
then the lambda would be larger for SPACs with large proceeds. Second, larger SPACs 
56 Previous studies focus on the characteristics of firms which choose to issue units instead of shares. 
Schultz (1993 JFE) finds that unit offerings reduce the agency cost of management spending free cash 
flows wastefully.  
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(with greater cash) could generate more interest among potential targets which are 
liquidity starved, hence their lambda would be bigger than their smaller counterparts. 
We expect either phenomenon could shorten the expected time to merger. We collected 
this information from the SPACs’ prospectus manually.  
 
5.7.5. Number of Managers per SPAC  
The number of managers each SPAC has may substantially impact the 
probability of and the time to a successful SPAC merger. On one hand, having more 
managers means a SPAC has more people who can actively search for a suitable 
acquisition target enhancing the magnitude of lambda. This disposition follows 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993, Academy of Management Journal), who find that 
firms with a large managerial team perform better, especially in a turbulent 
environment. On the other hand, having more managers may lead to a “free-rider” 
problem where each manager puts forth less effort than they would have otherwise and 
hopes other managers will do more than their fair share. We treat the “net” effect of the 
number of managers upon the time to merger as an empirical matter. The number of 
managers a SPAC has is manually collected data from the SPAC’s prospectus.  
 
5.7.6. Warrant Characteristics  
Like an option on a stock, the typical warrant on a SPAC entitles its holder to 
purchase one share of the SPAC common stock at a pre-specified price. Usually a 
warrant will become exercisable on the either the consummation of the SPAC’s initial 
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business combination57 or one year after the SPAC IPO, whichever takes longer to 
transpire. We have two views with respect to the effect of warrant conversions on the 
expected time to merger. On one hand, the number of warrant conversions signals the 
confidence of warrant holders about the prospect of a successful merger. On the other 
hand, as Miller (2008, Financier Worldwide) and Lakicevic, Shachmurove, and 
Vulanovic (2013, SSRN) point out, SPAC shareholders may face high dilution when a 
substantial proportion of warrant holders have chosen to exercise their conversion 
rights, thus the shareholders may exert less monitoring power on the SPAC managers. 
Consequently, the dilution may negatively impact the  prospect of a merger. We believe 
the “net” effect of warrants upon the expected time to merger is an empirical issue. We 
collect the following variables from SPAC prospectus to measure its warrant 
characteristics, namely, the number of warrants per unit, warrant exercise price, the 
ratio of warrant value relative to common stock value, whether the warrant is only 
exercisable after a successful merger, and the threshold of exercising the conversion 
right.  
 
5.7.7. The Characteristics of the SPAC’s IPO  
We employ two empirical variables to capture the impact of the characteristics 
of a SPAC’s IPO proceeds upon the expected time to merger: the percentage of total 
proceeds deposited into a trust and the percentage of total proceeds invested by insiders 
(mostly managers). 
57 A SPAC may make several mergers during its life time. In such cases, the warrants will become 
exercisable upon the completion of the first merger.  
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We believe the first variable speaks to shareholder protection. As Berger (2008, 
JACF) points out, a SPAC liquidates its proceeds in trust and returns them to the 
investors on a pro rata basis when it fails to consummate a business combination with 
the required time frame. Thus, the higher the percentage of proceeds deposited in the 
trust, the better the shareholders are protected, which should positively impact the 
merger outcome.  
The second variable relates to not only the managerial incentive but also the 
“warrant overhang” problem mentioned in the previous section. Insiders usually 
purchase the SPAC warrants prior to its IPO in a private placement transaction with 
their personal funds. The insider investment is then combined with the proceeds from 
the IPO and deposited into the trust. We believe the insider investment directly ties the 
managers’ financial well-being with the SPAC’s future performance. If the SPAC can 
consummate a business merger successfully, the managers could profit by converting 
their warrants to common shares. In addition, Lakicivic et. al (2013, SSRN) also claim 
that the insider purchase of warrants can effectively alleviate the “warrant overhang” 
problem. Therefore, we expect the insider investment to have a positive effect on the 
merger outcomes. 
 
5.7.8. Separate Trading of Warrants and Common Shares 
Hale (2007, JCAF) documents an important feature with respect to the trading of 
SPACs. Although a SPAC is issued and initially traded in units, its warrants can be 
traded separately from the common stocks after a waiting period. We measure the 
waiting period as the number of days after IPO.  
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 5.7.9. Series of Common Shares  
Seven SPACs in our sample of 194 choose to issue their common shares in two 
distinct series, A and B. The holders of series A shares face higher risks than those of 
series B holders. In particular, purchasers of series A units bear the expenses of 
underwriting discount and commissions relating to the sale of both series A units and 
series B units. Holders of series A units cannot vote. More importantly, holders of series 
A units are paid after those of series B units in the event of liquidation. Therefore, we 
believe the structure of separate series may create agency problems in which the 
managers and series B holders take advantage of series A holders by failing to complete 
a merger since the loss are mostly taken by the series A holders. We use a dummy 
variable to distinguish SPACs with such a structure.  
 
5.7.10. Auditors  
The financial statements included in prospectus of a SPAC have to be audited by 
an independent auditor. We record the auditor names for all SPACs and find that some 
auditors show up more often than others. To document their effect on the expected time 
to merger, we create a dummy variable for each auditing firm which participants in 
more the 20 SPACs’ audition. These auditing firms are Rothstein Kass, Goldstein 
Golub Kessler, Marcum, and BDO Seidman. We also create a dummy variable for 
SPACs whose financial statements are audited by the Big Four (KPMG, Deloittle, PwC, 
and Ernst & Young).  
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5.7.11. Empirical Results  
We start by running Cox regressions with each of the SPAC characteristics as 
the only RHS variable, subsequently, we combine all the significant features and run a 
multivariate Cox regression. The results are shown in the tables below. 
[Insert Table 2-13 about here] 
The univariate Cox regressions produce eleven statistically significant variables. 
Specifically, a SPAC’s total debt level is positively associated with the expected time to 
merger. A $1 million increase in total debt would increase the expected time to merger 
by 61.99% ((1.6199 – 1)*100%). This result seems to suggest that private targets are 
concerned about the fixed claims held against the SPAC becoming a burden of the new 
firm after the merger. Comparing SPACs with less than 18 months to expiration, 
SPACs with 18 – 24 months of life span experience a dramatic reduction in expected 
time to merger, which is about 43.45% ((0.5655-1)*100%). Comparing to AMEX, 
listings in NASDAQ, NYSE, and OTC tends to increase the expected time to merger by 
83.99%, 95.27%, and 46.63%. This result suggests that AMEX offers the SPACs the 
best exposure to potential private targets. Both the number of offering units and the 
number of managers reduce the expected time to merger, suggesting that higher offering 
proceeds and more managers facilitate the merger process. The results on the number of 
unit offering support the idea that higher proceeds increase lambda either because 
higher proceeds are attractive to cash starved private firms or because there are many 
large private firms which require higher proceeds in merger payments. The results on 
the number of managers indicate the benefits of having additional managers on board 
outweigh the cost of a possible free-rider problem.  
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With respect to the warrant characteristics, we find the expected time to merger 
increases with the decrease in exercise price and increase in the warrant value relative to 
the common share value. A $1 decrease in exercise price increases the expected time to 
merger by 8.61% [= 100%*(1-0.9139)]. A 1 percentage point increase in the warrant 
value relative to the common share value is associated with a 0.60% [=100%*(1.0060-
1)] increase in the expected time to merger. The results are consistent with our “warrant 
overhang” story. Specifically, dilution occurs when warrants are converted into 
common shares, which is more likely when the exercise price is low and when the 
warrants value is high relative to common shares.  
We also find that a 1 percentage point increase in the proceeds deposited in a 
trust decreases the expected time to merger by 6.0% [=100%*(1-0.9400)]. Last but not 
least, SPACs audited by the Big Four enjoy a shorter time to merger. 
[Insert Table 2-14 about here] 
When we run a multivariate regression with the individually significant 
variables combined on the RHS, we find only three variables remain statistically 
significant. The expected time to merger will decrease when the number of offering 
units goes up, when the total debt level goes down, and when the proceeds deposited in 
trust goes up. The result on the number of unit offering indicates that higher offering 
proceeds provide a SPAC with larger financial capacity to acquire target firms. The 
results also confirm our hypothesis that higher proceeds deposited in trust provide better 
protection to the shareholders and hence improves the merger outcome. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper used a simple target acquisition model to guide an empirical 
investigation of the determinants of the time to a successful merger between a SPAC 
and a private firm. We considered seven sources of independent variables including 
SPAC managerial characteristics, investor characteristics, underwriter characteristics, 
macroeconomic conditions, financial conditions, the “first mover” phenomenon, and the 
SPAC characteristics. Survival analysis established that these sources provided over 
twenty right hand side variables as being statistically significant in the determination of 
the time to merger. 
  
128 
References 
Ahn, S., Jiraporn, P., & Kim, Y. S. (2010). Multiple directorships and acquirer 
returns. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(9), 2011-2026. 
 
Alavi, A., Pham, P. K., & Pham, T. M. (2008). Pre-IPO ownership structure and its 
impact on the IPO process. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(11), 2361-2375. 
Berger, R. (2008). SPACs: An Alternative Wav to Access the Public Markets.Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 20(3), 68-75. 
 
Brau, J., Fawcett, S., 2006.  Initial public offerings:  analysis of theory and practice.  
Journal of Finance 61, 399-436. 
 
Brav, A., & Gompers, P. A. (2003). The role of lockups in initial public 
offerings.Review of Financial Studies, 16(1), 1-29. 
 
Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). The Influence of Institutions 
on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from 
TIAA‐CREF. The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1335-1362. 
 
Casares Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards 
detrimental?. Journal of Financial Economics. 
 
Chen, H. C., & Ritter, J. R. (2000). The seven percent solution. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(3), 1105-1131. 
 
Cheng, A., He Huang, H., Li, Y., & Lobo, G. (2010). Institutional monitoring through 
shareholder litigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 356-383. 
 
Cox, D. R. (1972). Regression models and life tables. JR stat soc B, 34(2), 187-220. 
 
Edmans, A., Fang, V. W., & Zur, E. (2013). The effect of liquidity on 
governance. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1443-1482. 
 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing 
firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35-54. 
 
Fernando, C., Gatchev, V., and Spindt, P., 2006.  Wanna dance?  How firms and 
underwriters choose each other.  Journal of Finance 60, 2437-2469. 
 
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors?. The Journal 
of Finance, 61(2), 689-724. 
 
Gleason, K., Jain, R., Rosenthal, L., 2006.  Alternatives for going public: evidence from 
reverse takeovers, self-underwritten IPOs, and traditional IPOs.  Working paper, 
Available at SSRN. 
129 
 
Gleason, K., Rosenthal, L., Wiggins, R., 2006.   Reverse takeovers:  backing into being 
public.  Journal of Corporate  Finance. 
 
Graham, J. R. (1999). Herding among investment newsletters: Theory and 
evidence. The Journal of Finance, 54(1), 237-268. 
 
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., & Wermers, R. (1995). Momentum investment strategies, 
portfolio performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior.The 
American economic review, 1088-1105. 
 
Hale, L. M. (2007). SPAC: A financing tool with something for everyone. Journal of 
Corporate Accounting & Finance, 18(2), 67-74. 
 
Harford, J. (2005). What drives merger waves?. Journal of Financial Economics,77(3), 
529-560. 
 
Harris, J. H., Panchapagesan, V., & Werner, I. M. (2006). Liquidity and Shareholder 
Wealth: The Value of Nasdaq Listing. University of Delaware Working Paper. 
 
Herrera, H., & Schroth, E. (2011). Advantageous innovation and imitation in the 
underwriting market for corporate securities. Journal of Banking & 
Finance,35(5), 1097-1113. 
 
Ibbotson, R., Ritter, J., Sindelar, J., 1998.  Initial public offerings.  Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 1, 37-45. 
 
Jeng, L. A., & Wells, P. C. (2000). The determinants of venture capital funding: 
evidence across countries. Journal of Corporate Finance, 6(3), 241-289. 
 
Klein, A., & Zur, E. (2009). Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and 
other private investors. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 187-229. 
 
Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture 
capital reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), 1295. 
 
Lakicevic, Milan and Shachmurove, Yochanan and Vulanovic, Milos, On Mergers, 
Acquisitions and Liquidation Using Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies 
(SPACs) (February 1, 2013). The North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2014.03.002; PIER Working Paper No. 13-013. 
 
Lee, I., Lochhead, S., Ritter, J., Zhao, J., 1996.  The costs of raising capital.  Journal of 
Financial Research 19, 59-74. 
 
Lewellen, S. (2009). SPACs as an asset class. Available at SSRN 1284999.  
130 
 
Lowry, M. (2003). Why does IPO volume fluctuate so much? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 67(1), 3-40. 
 
Lowry, M., & Schwert, G. W. (2002). IPO market cycles: Bubbles or sequential 
learning?. The Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1171-1200.  
 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and 
the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics,89(1), 20-43. 
 
Martinussen, T., & Scheike, T. H. (2006). Dynamic regression models for survival data. 
Springer. 
 
Maug, E., 1998.  Large shareholders as monitors:  is there a trade-off between liquidity 
and control?  Journal of Finance 53, 65-98. 
 
Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. (1991). Venture capitalist certification in initial 
public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879-903. 
 
Miller, D. A. (2008). SPAC IPOs in 2008. Financier Worldwide. 
 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., Zingales, A. L., 1998.  Why do companies go public?  An 
empirical analysis.  Journal of Finance 53, 27-64. 
 
Rajgopal, S., Shevlin, T., & Zamora, V. (2006). CEOs' outside employment 
opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation 
contracts. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1813-1844. 
 
Schultz, P., 1993, Calls of warrants:  timing and market reaction.  Journal of Finance 
48, 681-696. 
 
Thompson, A. (2010). Organizational form and investment decisions: The case of 
special purpose acquisition companies. Purdue University. 
 
Tufano, P. (2003). Financial innovation. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1, 
307-335. 
 
Wermers, R. (1999). Mutual fund herding and the impact on stock prices. The Journal 
of Finance, 54(2), 581-622. 
 
Yim, S. (2013). The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition 
behavior. Journal of Financial Economics. 
  
131 
Appendix 2-1 
 
Leibnitz’s Rule: 
∫=
)(
)(
)(
xh
xg
dxxfy  
))(()())(()()('
)(
)(
xgf
x
xgxhf
x
xhdxxf
x
y xh
xg
⋅
∂
∂
−⋅
∂
∂
+=
∂
∂
∫  
  
132 
Appendix 2-2 
 
Does ∫
∞
=
0
1)( dxxf  
where ? 
We have 1)0(
00
==−= −
∞
−
∞
−∫ λλλλ eedxe xx  
so  for  makes sense as a pdf for the time for a merger target to become 
within the “purview” (consideration) of the SPAC. 
  
133 
Appendix 2-3 
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Appendix 2-10: Are First Movers Smaller? 
Small buyers could have a difficult time acquiring large targets. In the SPAC 
setting, we posit that size could be one of the explanations as to why it takes longer for 
first mover SPACs to find a merger partner. In particular, small SPACs may not be able 
to catch the attention of many potential targets. Here we conduct difference in means 
test (t-test) to examine if first mover SPACs are relatively small comparing to “slow” 
mover SPACs. Our variable of interest, size, is measured as the ratio of total proceeds of 
a particular SPAC from its IPO to the median proceeds among all SPACs in our sample. 
We use three measures to characterize first mover SPACs, namely the first 10%, 
25%, and 50% of all SPACs, respectively. The table below shows first mover SPACs 
are indeed much smaller than other SPACs. The results are robust to all three first 
mover measures and confirm our argument that first movers SPACs are unattractive to 
potential merger partners partially due to their size. 
Group 1 Group 2 
Mean 
Group1 
Mean 
Group2 p-value 
First 10% of all SPACs The rest 90% of all SPACs 0.73 2.09 0.0018 
First  25% of all SPACs The rest 75% of all SPACs 1.06 2.22 0.0007 
First 50% of all SPACs The rest 50% of all SPACs 1.30 2.57 0.0000 
 
 
  
142 
Appendix 2-11: Sample of First Mover Dummy Variables 
 
The table below provides a sample on how the first mover dummy variables are 
entered into our data spreadsheet.  
SPAC ID 
(cik #) IPO Date 
First 
10% of 
All 
SPACs 
First 
25% of 
All 
SPACs 
First 
50% of 
All 
SPACs 
1310817 2/24/2005 1 1 1 
1327012 9/14/2005 0 1 1 
1337749 3/14/2007 0 0 1 
1436612 8/15/2008 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2-13 Tables 
 
Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics on Managerial Characteristics 
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Table 2-2: Cox Regressions on Managerial Characteristics 
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Table 2-3: Descriptive Statistics on Investor Characteristics 
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Table 2-4: Cox Regressions on Investor Characteristics 
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Table 2-5: Cox Regressions on Investor Characteristics (Multivariate) 
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Table 2-6: Cox Regressions on Macroeconomic Conditions (Bivariate & 
Multivariate) 
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Table 2-7: Descriptive Statistics of Underwriter Characteristics 
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Table 2-8: Cox Regressions on Underwriter Characteristics 
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 Table 2-9: Cox Regressions on Underwriter Characteristics (Multivariate) 
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Table 2-10: Cox Regressions on Financial Conditions 
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Table 2-11: Cox Regressions on Financial Conditions (Multivariate) 
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Table 2-12: Cox Regressions on First Movers 
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Table 2-13: Cox Regressions on Underwriter Characteristics 
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 Table 2-14: Cox Regressions on Underwriter Characteristics (Multivariate) 
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Chapter 3: Media Exposure and Executive Compensation:  
An Analysis of Turnover Events58 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the role of the media has emerged as one of the key factors 
affecting corporate policies. For example, it has been shown that the media could help 
to reverse the violations in corporate governance and to detecting accounting fraud 
(Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales [2008], Miller [2006]). However, there is limited 
understanding on the role of media on executive pay. In this paper, we study how 
incoming CEOs’ media exposure influences the changes in compensation relative to 
their predecessors’ during turnover events.  
Media coverage can influence executive compensation through two channels. 
On one hand, the media may play as a “watchdog” which provides external monitoring 
power to the firms. If so, higher media exposure would translate into more careful 
scrutiny over boards determining the compensation packages of the CEOs. Therefore, 
highly visible CEOs will not receive higher compensation offers while having higher 
pay-for-performance in their compensation packages (Media scrutiny hypothesis).   
On the other hand, the media may act as a “cheerleader” which selectively 
reports positive news on the subjects. When a CEO persistently receives positive news 
coverage, recruiting firms tend to label the CEO with positively biased image. 
Consequently, the recruiting firms would be willing to pay more to hire the “star” 
CEOs. Furthermore, “star” CEOs can shop around and apply for several positions with 
58 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Vahap B. Uysal. 
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multiple firms because of their high visibilities in the news. They could then pick the 
most favorable compensation packages from several firms – those with higher total pay 
and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. (Media hype hypothesis).  
To test these hypotheses, we focus on executive turnover events which provide 
the board of directors with unique opportunities to restructure the executive 
compensation package. In absence of the turnover, it is difficult to negotiate with an 
incumbent CEO and change the existing compensation package. Rather, the negotiation 
with the incoming CEO can go easier, especially when the successor is young and less 
entrenched. We measure the incoming CEO’s media exposure with the number of news 
reports, excluding firm-originated newswires and press release wires, during the 12 
months prior to the appointment. While media’s “watchdog” role lines up with the 
board’s interest of limiting total pay and increasing incentives, its “cheerleader” role 
inflates the value of the incoming CEOs and enables them to exact more rents from the 
firm. We hypothesize that when media scrutiny (hype) effect dominates, incoming 
CEOs with higher media exposures receives more (fewer) incentives such as stock and 
option grants, higher pay-for-performance sensitivities, and lower (higher) total pay. 
We use OLS regressions to examine the effect of media on the change in composition 
and level of CEO compensation.  
Our findings reveal strong association between media exposure and composition 
of executive compensation. Specifically, we find that having a media exposure affects 
the composition of the compensation package. However, it does not does not influence 
total compensation to a CEO. Highly visible CEOs are offered with more stock and 
option awards which lead to higher deltas. In general, CEOs are compensated more 
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effectively when their media exposure is high. Collectively, these findings are 
consistent with the media scrutiny hypothesis. 
We also consider the endogeneity of media exposure. Most notably, having media 
exposure is related to a firm’s size, industry, previous stock performance, growth opportunity, 
and board characteristics. In addition to controlling for these factors in our analyses, we take 
further steps to disentangle the effect on executive pay of having media exposure. Specifically, 
we implement propensity score matching and replicate the analysis. To a large extent, the 
propensity score approach reduces the possibility that the firms hiring low-visibility CEOs are 
fundamentally different from firms hiring high-visibility CEOs. The results from the 
propensity score matching approach support our findings from the OLS regressions that 
the media provides scrutiny and monitoring power over boards determining the 
compensation packages to the incoming CEOs.  
This study is related to the monitoring role of the media in corporate policies. 
Dyck et al (2008) present evidence that the media helps to reverse corporate governance 
violations. Joe et al (2009) document that the media coverage on board ineffectiveness 
forces the target to take corrective actions and leads to enhanced shareholder wealth. 
Miller (2006) points out that the press helps in the discovery of accounting fraud by 
rebroadcasting and conducting original investigations. This study extends the existing 
literature by exploring the influence of the media monitoring power on executive 
compensation contracts.   
The paper also contributes to the literature on how executive turnover events 
influence executive compensation and future firm performance. Elsaid and Davidson III 
(2009) address the issue by concentrating on the negotiating power between the boards 
and the newly appointed CEOs. When the board has dominating bargaining power, 
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incoming CEOs have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of 
salary. Murphy (2002) compares the pay to inside and outside incoming CEOs and finds 
outside replacements are usually paid more than inside replacements. Blackwell et al. 
(2007) document that future firm performance is positively related to the proportion of 
stock grants to the new CEOs. In an attempt to explain the changes in executive 
compensation surrounding turnover events, our paper extends the investigation by 
incorporating CEO media exposure into consideration.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework as well as the development of hypotheses. Data and empirical issues are 
discussed in Section 3. In section 4, we report univariate and multivariate analyses on 
how executive media coverage impacts executive compensation. We conduct a number 
of robustness checks, which are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
While media coverage receives great attention in asset pricing research, existing 
literature on the relation between media coverage and corporate policies is limited 
(Zingales [2000]). The research that does exist presents contrasting findings. Some 
literature suggests that the press serves as “watchdogs” which provide external 
monitoring power. On the other hand, media may act as “cheerleaders” providing 
systematically positively biased information. The following subsections provide more 
detailed discussion on the conflicting findings. 
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2.1.Media Hypes 
When media behaves as “cheerleaders”, it hypes individuals and firms by 
selectively presenting positive information. As a result, audience perceives the 
individuals and firms with disproportionally positive images. There are several reasons 
media may produce hypes. 
First, the subjects of media stories demand less unfavorable reports about 
themselves. Often the subjects are also the advertisers who the media has to rely on and 
hence cater to. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) document that personal finance publications 
are more likely to recommend mutual funds of their advertisers, but national 
newspapers do not present the pattern. Gurun and Butler (2012) show local newspapers 
use fewer negative words on local companies. Moreover, the local bias is more evident 
for firms with higher advertising expenditures. The adverting income pressurizes media 
to hype the subjects.  
 Second, firms are more likely to be hyped when board members are connected 
with mass media. Gurun (2011) finds that firms with a media expert on board receive 
40% more news coverage and the news reports contain 25% fewer negative words.  
Third, the demand for news services results in media sensationalism. Jensen 
(1979) argues that most demand for news services derives not from a demand for 
information, but from a demand for entertainment. Consequently, media tend to 
sensationalize stories to attract audience. Similarly, Gurun and Butler (2012) argue that 
local media are more likely to reproduce the qualitative content of company news 
releases, which are like to be positive in tone.   
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There are at least two channels through which the media hype could positively 
affect executive compensation. First, media hype inflates a firm’s evaluation on a CEO 
talent. A firm evaluates a CEO candidate based on the information set it gathers. The 
press serves as an extremely important and trustworthy source of information. If the 
press consistently provides positively biased information about the CEO candidate, the 
firm would perceive that the candidate possesses superior talent. As a result, the firm 
would spend more than it needs to hire the CEO with media hypes. Second, “star” 
CEOs receive more attention and hence are presented with more job opportunities. 
Consequently, “star” CEOs can shop around and choose the most favorable 
compensation package. Under both cases, firms tend to pay more in total compensation 
and set a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity.      
H1.A: When media hype effect dominates, incoming CEOs with higher media 
exposures earn more total pay than those with lower media exposures. 
H1.B: The compensation package provides the incoming CEO with fewer 
incentives and lower pay-for-performance sensitivities when media hypes the incoming 
CEOs. 
 
2.2.Media Scrutiny 
The press could act as “watchdogs” if it can discover information from various 
sources, such as employees and customers, and report negative news before the news is 
disclosed by firms. In other words, the asymmetry in information disclosure may cause 
media to publish information with negative tones. Miller (2006) empirically investigates 
the role of media in detecting accounting fraud, and he finds that media provides the 
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public with the information about accounting fraud. Dyck et al (2008) examine the role 
of media in monitoring corporate governance violations in Russia during 1999 to 2002. 
The news coverage in Western media increases the chance that a corporate governance 
violation is reversed. Farrell and Whidbee (2002) show that media scrutiny of poor firm 
performance increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.  
When the media plays as a “watchdog”, it could negative impact the executive 
compensation for the following reasons. First, negative media exposure hurt executive 
reputations. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that the value of managers’ human 
capital depends on the signals about the managers’ performance as corporate decision 
makers. CEOs with high media exposure understand that their compensation packages 
are likely to be studied by the media carefully; hence they have incentives to keep the 
total pay low enough to avoid media attention. To offset the loss in total pay, they 
would ask for higher pay-for-performance sensitivities which increase the compensation 
as firm performance improves. Second, the board of directors understands that media 
exposure translates into external monitoring power which reduces the CEO rent-
extracting activities. Together, we predict that 
H2.A: When media scrutiny effect dominates, incoming CEOs with higher media 
exposures earn less total pay than those with lower media exposures. 
H2.B: The compensation package provides the incoming CEO with higher 
incentives when media acts as an external monitor. 
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3. Data Source, Sample Selection, and Empirical Design 
3.1. Data Source 
The annual data on managerial compensation and executive characteristics 
comes from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp. ExecuComp contains data from annual 
proxy statements for at least five top executives for S&P 1500 firms since 1992. 
Variables to be included in my analysis include executive cash pay, bonus, stock grants, 
option grants, income in other forms, CEO tenure, etc. In terms of identifying executive 
turnover events, ExecuComp provides two key variables of interest: the date on which 
an executive leaves office and the date on which an executive becomes CEO. A 
turnover is identified if a firm i has a predecessor CEO p who left the firm in the same 
calendar year in which a successor CEO s took office. We construct a pair of CEOs, a 
predecessor p and a successor s, by matching on calendar year and firm ID. Next we 
construct the measures of the changes in compensation between the successor CEO and 
the predecessor CEO. The relative change in total compensation is measured as the 
difference in total compensation to the successor CEO in the event year t and that to the 
predecessor CEO in the prior year, scaled by the total compensation to the predecessor 
CEO in the prior year. 
p
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The change in component pay is measure as: 
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−−  
in which superscripts s and p stand for successor and predecessor respectively. Tot 
measures the annual total compensation paid to executives and Comp stands for a 
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certain component of the executive compensations, such as salary, bonus, stock awards, 
etc. We use the predecessor compensation in the prior year because the predecessor 
CEO may receive other compensation (such as golden parachutes) that is pertinent to 
the turnover events. 
We have two other measures of incentive - delta and vega – generated from the 
compensation package59. Both delta and vega measure the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to firm stock performance. More specifically, delta measures the 
executive compensation sensitivity to the change in stock price, while vega measures 
that to the change in stock volatility. The delta and vega measures could capture the 
incentives generated from the compensation packages.  
We use Factiva to obtain CEO news coverage information. We look at the 
number of news reports that involve the incoming CEO’s full name 12 months prior to 
the appointment. To eliminate the noise, we exclude news wires and press releases that 
are generated by the firm. To determine the type of turnover, we search the Factiva for 
the reasons of the turnovers. We will classify a turnover as “voluntary” if the turnover 
relates to retirement, death, illness, etc. Following Parrino (1997), we use the age of 60 
to be the normal retirement age for CEOs.  
Data on firm characteristics, financial performance and other firm-specific 
information are collected from COMPUSTAT annual files. Information on board of 
directors is obtained from the RiskMetrics. My final sample contains 815 executive 
turnover events and covers from 1996 to 2006.  
59 Coles et al. (2006) finds that higher delta leads to riskier policy choices, including more investment in 
R&D, less investment in tangible assets, and higher leverage.  
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All variables are winsorized at the 2nd the 98th percentiles. See Appendix 3-1 for 
detailed variable definitions. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3-1. On 
average, the incoming CEOs earn $5.25 million less than their predecessors each year. 
An average incoming CEO has 127 pieces of news reports during the one year period 
prior to the announcement of their appointment.  
[Insert Table 3-1 about here] 
 
3.2. Regression Models 
To test for the difference in compensations for outgoing and incoming CEOs 
(hypothesis #1 & #2), we plan to conduct both univariate t-tests and multivariate 
regressions. If the change in compensation is positively (negatively) related to the news 
coverage, cheerleader (watchdog) hypothesis is supported. 
We use the following regression models: 
εηγβα ++++= **** CtrlCEOBoardNewschg  
The dependent variable chg measures the relative difference in total 
compensation or the change in component pay between the incoming and the outgoing 
CEOs. Board, CEO, and Ctrl are matrices that capture the effects of board, CEO, and 
firm characteristics. The key variable of interest would be News, which captures CEOs’ 
media visibility. We have two measure of the News. In Table 3-3 we measure it as the 
natural log of the number of news reports involving the incoming CEO during the 1 
year period prior to the appointment. In Table 3-4 we measure it with a vector of three 
dummy variables which equal to 1 for CEOs belonging to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles in 
news exposure, respectively.  
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 3.3. Propensity Score Matching 
The analysis so far suffers from endogeneity issues. Specifically, firms that hire 
high visibility CEOs may be fundamentally different from firms that hire low visibility 
CEOs. One way to address the issue is to implement the propensity score matching to 
estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of the CEO visibility on the change in 
compensations. 
The first step of the propensity score matching procedure is to perform a Probit 
estimation of the probability of being in the treatment group (i.e., of hiring highly 
visible CEOs) based on firm characteristics. Next, we use the estimated probability to 
form matched pairs of observations with similar estimated probabilities but different 
realizations of the treatment (i.e., similar in firm characteristics but hiring CEOs with 
different media visibility). Finally, we calculated the ATE of the treated CEOs (i.e., 
those with the highest media exposure) for the change in total compensation and the 
changes in each component. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
In this subsection, we compare the changes in each component of executive 
compensation between CEOs with different media visibility. To do this, we first sort all 
incoming CEOs into quartiles based on the number of news reports during the 12-month 
period prior to their appointment. Second, we perform t-tests to detect whether the 
means of each compensation component is equal between the CEOs in the lowest 
quartile and those in the highest quartile. Table 3-2 displays the results of the univariate 
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analysis. Regardless of media exposure, incoming CEOs in all quartiles earn less in 
total compensation than their predecessors. The decrease in total compensation is larger 
among CEOs with higher media coverage, which is surprising. Highly visible CEOs, 
however, have higher deltas from their compensation package. These CEOs also have 
more bonuses and stocks relative to the total compensation. In summary, when 
successor CEOs are more visible in media reports, they are offered with more effective 
compensation packages, signaled by lower total pay and higher incentives. 
[Insert Table 3-2 about here] 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 3-3 reports the results from regression analyses. We run each dependent 
variable against our key variable of interest and three sets of control variables. The CEO 
media exposure, our key variable of interest is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
number of news reports during the 12 months prior to the appointment. The first set of 
control variables focus on firm characteristics. We use the market-book ratio, firm size, 
and previous stock returns as the controls. The second set of control variables include 
board size, average tenure, and percentage of outside directors and outside 
compensation committee members, which control for board quality. We also control for 
CEO age. All regressions are performed via OLS with White standard errors to correct 
for possible heteroscedasticity. 
[Insert Table 3-3 about here] 
Table 3-3 shows that the change in the weight of stock awards and that of option 
awards are positively associated with higher media coverage. A 1% increase in the 
number of news reports leads to 1.2 percentage point increase in the proportion of stock 
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awards relative to total compensation. The increase is equivalent to over 7% increase in 
the average weight of stock awards. Similarly, the proportion of option awards to new 
CEOs also increases as their news coverage increases. In terms of the pay-performance 
sensitivity measure of delta, CEOs with higher media attention are associated with 
higher delta from their compensation packages. It implies that the compensation to 
more visible CEOs is more closely tied to future firm performance. The results are 
statistically significant at 1% level.  
The effect of CEO media exposure on the relative change in total compensation 
is statistically insignificant (it has a p-value of 0.108), although the estimated coefficient 
is positive. In other words, CEO media visibility does not have a strong impact on the 
level of total compensation. We do not find CEO media exposure has significant 
impacts on the changes in the weight of salary, bonus, and compensation in other forms. 
To sum up, when incoming CEOs are more visible under media coverage, their 
compensation packages tend to be more effective. Without being paid more in total, the 
incoming CEOs have higher stock and option awards as well as higher delta. 
Consequently, their compensation packages provide higher incentives to improve firm 
performance. The firms are able to better align the incoming CEOs’ interest with 
shareholders. More importantly, the goal is achieved without raise the level of total pay.  
We notice that the measure of CEO news exposure – the natural logarithm of the 
number of news reports – is highly positively skewed. We are concerned that the 
statistical significance we reported in Table 3-3 is mainly driven by the outliers on the 
right tail. To address the issue, we run the regressions again with a different measure of 
news coverage – a dummy variable which equals to 1 for CEOs in the 4th (top) quartile 
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of news exposure and 0 otherwise. Using the dummy variable instead of the continuous 
variable, we get rid of the outliers and we reserve the qualitative difference in CEO 
news coverage. The results are reported in Table 3-4 
[Insert Table 3-4 about here] 
Table 3-4 shows that the overall results from Table 3-3 are largely retained. 
Specifically, CEOs in the top quartile receive more options grants in compensation. In 
other words, more visible CEOs in the media are compensated more with option grants. 
High option pay, in turn, leads to high delta, which indicates that more visible CEOs are 
compensated with higher pay-for-performance sensitivities and their wealth is more 
closely linked to future firm performance. We do not find the media coverage plays an 
important role in affecting the stock grants and total pay.  
To sum up, our evidences in Table 3-4 are largely consistent with those in Table 
3-3. The empirical results suggest that CEO news exposure is an important determinant 
in the relative change in option awards and in delta, which lead to higher incentives and 
pay-for-performance sensitivities. These changes are achieved without paying 
significantly more in total to the incoming CEOs. Our findings support the media 
scrutiny hypothesis that the media provides external monitoring and helps in designing 
more effective compensation contracts to incoming CEOs. 
 
4.3.Propensity Score Matching  
[Insert Table 3-5 about here] 
Table 3-5 presents the results from the propensity score matching procedures, 
which addresses the concern of endogeneity. We first estimate the propensity of a firm 
which chooses to hire a CEO with high media exposure. The high media exposure is 
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proxied by a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the CEO belongs to the top quartile 
of news coverage and 0 otherwise. The propensity score is estimated via a probit model 
based on a series of firm and board characteristics. The results from the probit model 
are reported in Table C1. We then match firms that hire CEOs in the top quartile of 
media exposure with firms that fire CEOs in the lowest quartile of media exposure 
based on the propensity scores. We apply the Kernel matching algorithm which uses the 
weighted average of all cases in the control group to estimate artificial outcomes. The 
weight is calculated by the propensity score distance between a treatment case and all 
control cases. The Kernel matching allows us to assign higher weight to the closest 
control groups. Lastly, we estimate the average treatment effects (ATE) of hiring a 
highly visible CEO among firms with similar propensity scores. Table 3-5 reports the 
ATE estimates. In detail, it reports the average treatment effect (ATE) on the changes in 
various components of compensation, where the treatment is defined as CEOs being in 
the top quartile of media coverage. Our results show that after matching firm and board 
characteristics, CEO media exposure exerts effects on some components of the total 
compensation package, namely stock awards, option awards, delta, and other income. 
The results from the propensity score matching procedure are consistent with the results 
from regression analysis. Although incoming CEOs do not experience significant 
changes in total compensation, they receive more stock and option grants which tie their 
compensation closely to firm performance. More important, the propensity score 
matching approach allows us to at least partially address the endogeneity. In other 
words, it helps to eliminate the possibility that firms hiring less visible CEOs are 
fundamentally different from firms hiring highly visible CEOs.  
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4.4. Univariate Test across Firm Size Quartiles 
Table 3-6 compares the difference in the means of executive compensation 
variables across firm size quartiles. We first sort all observations into quartiles based on 
firm size, which is measured as the natural logarithm of total firm assets at the event 
year. For observations in the top and bottom quartile, we then conduct difference of 
means tests for each executive compensation variable. The bottom of Table 3-6 reports 
the t-statistics and p-values of the tests.  
[Insert Table 3-6 about here] 
With the exceptions of the changes in the weight of stock awards and bonus, the 
tests generally indicate that the executive compensation variables do not exhibit large 
variations across firm size quartiles. Therefore we argue that firm size is not heavily 
related with the measures of executive compensation. The link between the changes in 
the components of compensation and CEO news exposure is not affected by firm 
characteristics.  
 
5. Robustness Checks 
5.1. Alternative Dependent Variables 
In our previous regression models, we define the dependent variable chg as the 
change in the weights of compensation components between the successor CEOs and 
the predecessor CEOs. This definition directly measures how the board modifies the 
compensation contract with the incoming CEO based on the contract to the outgoing 
executive. Most newly appointed CEOs, however, were employed by the firms of which 
they become CEOs later. We believe the board is interested in modifying the 
compensation contract to the new CEOs after the appointment. In other words, an 
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individual’s employee contract would differ from his/her CEO contract in terms of 
component pays and total pay. We define the chg variable as the change in the weights 
of compensation components for the same individual before and after he/she becomes 
CEO. Mathematically, the change in component pay and total pay are defined as 
s
t
s
t
s
t
s
t
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Tot
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1
1
−
−−  and s
t
s
t
s
t
Tot
TotTot
1
1
−
−− , 
where s, comp, and tot stand for successor CEO, component pay, and total 
compensation, respectively. Unreported summary statistics show that the weights in 
stock awards, option awards, salary, and bonus increase for individual who become 
CEO. Other compensation and total compensation, however, decrease after the event. 
Table 3-7 presents the results from replicating the regression model in Table 3-3 with 
alternative dependent variables.  
[Insert Table 3-7 about here] 
Table 3-7 shows that only the change in the weight of stock awards is 
marginally significantly related to CEO news coverage. However, the negative 
correlation is surprising. We don’t have a good explanation for the sign. The weights in 
other components are not significantly related to the CEO news coverage. Based on the 
findings, we argue that the board uses the outgoing CEO’s compensation as a 
benchmark when making decisions on the incoming CEO’s compensation. The 
incoming CEO’s compensation history is not a significant factor in the process.  
 
5.2. Internal versus External Hire 
Naveen (2006) points out that it becomes quite common that firms make plans 
to respond to future CEO turnovers by recruiting potential future CEO candidate as an 
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top executive (but not CEO) several years prior to the turnover. Our observation is 
consistent with the argument. Specially, most successor CEOs were employed by the 
firm of which they become CEOs later. We believe that the source of hiring could play 
an important role in the compensation negotiations. Realizing most recruitment is 
conducted internally, we define an internal hire as a dummy variable which is equal to 1 
when the incoming CEO worked in the firm 2 years prior to the CEO appointment. 
Table 3-8 reports the results from regressions with the internal hire variable included. 
[Insert Table 3-8 about here] 
In general, our main results hold. The weights in stock awards and option 
awards are still positive and significantly related to the executive news exposure. CEOs 
with higher media exposure tend to have higher delta, which is also consistent with our 
prior results. Internal hire decreases the weight in stock awards and in bonuses. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the role of the media in affecting executive compensation by 
studying how incoming CEOs’ media exposure is associated with the changes in 
compensation relative to their predecessors during turnover events. We find that the 
successor CEOs do not earn more in total than their predecessors. However, the 
proportion of stocks and options relative to the total pay are significantly higher among 
CEOs with higher media exposures. Moreover, the compensation packages provide high 
delta to more visible CEOs. 
Our findings imply that the media acts an external monitor who helps the firms 
set up effective compensation schemes with executives by increasing the incentive 
components and tying the executive’s wealth with future firm performance. Our paper 
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also implies that the executive turnover events are great opportunities for the firm to 
better align executive’s interest with shareholders’ at low cost. Our paper does not 
answer the question of the relation between media exposure and future firm 
performance. We leave the topic for future research.  
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Appendix 3-1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Detailed Definitions 
Market-Book Number of common shares outstanding * Closing price of the fiscal year/book value of equity 
Log(Assets) The natural logarithm of (1 + total assets) 
Board Size The total number of members on the board of directors, including the chair 
Compensation 
Committee Size The total number of members on the Compensation Committee 
Pct of Outside 
Directors 
The percentage of outside directors on board. Outsiders are 
defined as those who are not former employees, not interlocked 
with the firm's CEO, and not related by business relationships 
Pct of Outside Comp 
Cmt Members 
The percentage of outside directors on the compensation 
committee. Outsiders are defined as those who are not former 
employees, not interlocked with the firm's CEO, and not related 
by business relationships 
CEO age The age of the CEO of the year 
log(Total Comp) the natural logarithm of (1 + total compensation) 
Weight of Salary Salary for CEO i in year t divided by the total compensation for CEO i in year t 
Weight of Bonus Bonus for CEO i in year t divided by the total compensation for CEO i in year t 
Weight of Stock 
Awards 
Stock grants for CEO i in year t divided by the total compensation 
for CEO i in year t 
Weight of Option 
Awards 
Option grants for CEO i in year t divided by the total 
compensation for CEO i in year t 
Weight of Other 
Income 
Other income for CEO i in year t divided by the total 
compensation for CEO i in year t 
Relative Chg in Total 
Compensation 
The difference in total compensation for the incoming CEO in 
year t and for the outgoing CEO in year t-1, scaled by the total 
compensation for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
Chg in Weight of 
Salary 
The difference between the weight in salary for the incoming 
CEO in year t and that for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
Chg in  Weight of 
Bonus 
The difference between the weight in bonus for the incoming 
CEO in year t and that for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
Chg in Weight of Stock 
Awards  
The difference between the weight in stock grants for the 
incoming CEO in year t and that for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
179 
Chg in Weight of 
Option Awards  
The difference between the weight in option grants for the 
incoming CEO in year t and that for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
Chg in Weight of Other 
Income  
The difference between the weight in other income for the 
incoming CEO in year t and that for the outgoing CEO in year t-1 
Delta 
The dollar change in CEO wealth in response to a 1% change in 
firm stock price. See Coles et al (2006) for detailed calculation 
procedures. 
Vega 
The dollar change in CEO wealth in response to a 1% change in 
firm stock volatility. See Coles et al (2006) for detailed 
calculation procedures. 
log(# News Reports) The natural logarithm of (1+the number of news reports involving the incoming CEO during the 12 months prior to the appointment) 
News_qt 
A dummy variable which equals to 1 if the incoming CEO 
belongs to the top quartile in terms of news coverage and 0 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 3-2: Tables 
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Table 3-1: Regression Analysis 
 
The table presents results of pooled OLS regressions with White standard errors of the 
following model: 
εηγβα ++++= **** CtrlCEOBoardNewschg  
chg stands for the relative change in total compensation or the change in the weight of 
each component (i.e., salary, bonus, etc.); News is the natural logarithm of the number 
of news reports. Board stands for board characteristics, including board size, average 
director age, so on. CEO stands for CEO age. Ctrl standards for control variables at firm 
level, including market-book, firm size, ect. Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values of 
the estimates above them. +, *, ** indicate two-tail statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3-2: Regression Analysis 
 
The table presents results of pooled OLS regressions with White standard errors of the 
following model: 
εηγβα ++++= ****_ CtrlCEOBoardqtNewschg  
Chg stands for the relative change in total compensation or the change in the weight of 
each component (i.e., salary, bonus, etc.); News_qt is a dummy variable which equals to 
1 for CEOs in the top (4th) quartile of news exposure, respectively. Board stands for 
board characteristics, including board size, average director age, so on. CEO stands for 
CEO age. Ctrl standards for control variables at firm level, including market-book, firm 
size, ect. Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values of the estimates above them. +, *, ** 
indicate two-tail statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3-3: Robustness Check on Dependent Variables 
 
This table replicates the regression model in Table 3. The model is specified as the 
following: 
εηγβα ++++= **** CtrlCEOBoardNewschg  
News is the natural logarithm of the number of news reports. Board stands for board 
characteristics, including board size, average director age, so on. CEO stands for CEO 
age. Ctrl standards for control variables at firm level, including market-book, firm size, 
ect. Chg stands for the relative change in total compensation or the change in the weight 
of each component (i.e., salary, bonus, etc.). Unlike Table 3, in which we measure the 
chg by comparing the difference in the compensation to the successors and the 
predecessor, here we compare the compensation to the successors only. More 
specifically, we compare the compensation to the successors in year t to that in year t-1. 
Mathematically, the change in component pay is defined as s
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−
−− , where s, comp, and tot stand for successor CEO, component pay, and 
total compensation, respectively.  
Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values of the estimates above them. +, *, ** indicate 
two-tail statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-4: Robustness Check on Internal Hire 
 
The table presents results of pooled OLS regressions with White standard errors of the 
following model: 
εηγβα ++++= **** CtrlCEOBoardNewschg  
Chg stands for the relative change in total compensation or the change in the weight of 
each component (i.e., salary, bonus, etc.); News is the natural logarithm of the number 
of news reports. Board stands for board characteristics, including board size, average 
director age, so on. CEO stands for CEO age. Ctrl standards for control variables at firm 
level, including market-book, firm size, ect. Internal Hire is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if the successor CEO was employed more than 2 years prior to the CEO 
appointment and 0 otherwise.  
Numbers in parenthesis are the p-values of the estimates above them. +, *, ** indicate 
two-tail statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table C 1: Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score Matching 
The table presents results from the first stage of the propensity score matching. The 
estimated coefficients from the probit model are reported in the first column. The p-
values corresponding to the estimates are reported in the parentheses under the 
coefficients. The sample means of the variable for firms with CEOs from the top and 
bottom news coverage quartiles are reported in the 2nd and 3rd columns, and p-values 
from t-tests are presented in the 4th column. +, *, ** indicate two-tail statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3-1 for detailed 
variable definitions. 
 
Dep. = 1 if 
incoming CEO 
in top exposure 
quartile 
Treatment 
Sample 
Mean 
Control 
Sample 
Mean 
Pr(diff) 
Market-Book -0.020 3.55 2.89 0.0101* 
  (0.515)       
log(Assets) 0.250** 8.42 7.28 0.0001** 
  (0.000)       
Stock Return 0.144+ 0.15 0.01 0.1048 
  (0.082)       
Stock Volatility 0.207 0.76 0.74 0.4974 
  (0.259)       
log(Captial Expenditures) 0.186** 4.64 3.67 0.0001** 
  (0.000)       
log(PPE) -0.178** 6.32 5.61 0.0010** 
  (0.001)       
log(Ad. Expenditures) 0.191** 2.26 0.80 0.0001** 
  (0.000)       
log(R&D) 0.051 2.86 2.03 0.0007** 
  (0.112)       
Compensation Committee Size 0.029 9.39 7.65 0.0001** 
  (0.196)       
Pct of Outside Directors -0.189 0.63 0.62 0.6550 
  (0.684)       
Avg. Director Tenure -0.020 7.70 7.42 0.5124 
  (0.315)       
Constant -2.161**       
  (0.000)       
          
# Treated  
(top media exposure quartile) 203       
# Untreated  
(bottom media exposure quartile) 217       
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